Strategic Tides and Regional Dynamics: The China-Bangladesh Military Engagements

Introduction

In the past decade, China’s military engagements with South Asia, particularly Bangladesh, have increased rapidly and garnered major attention. Beyond economic and infrastructure investments, China has progressively ventured into the realm of arms trade and has established itself as a major player among these states. This analysis explores the significant arms transactions between China and Bangladesh from 2010 to 2022, along with recent developments that illustrate the evolving dynamics of their relationship. It also examines the broader implications of these interactions for China's strategic posture within South Asia. The data used for this research has been sourced from the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) and the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 

Military Engagements

With Bangladesh, China has conducted a robust, consistent, and diverse set of arms transactions, highlighting its underlying importance. The arms sales range from battle tanks and large-calibre artillery systems to warships and missile launchers, signifying a comprehensive engagement. The data from both SIPRI and UNROCA show ongoing arms exchanges between the two countries, though the types of arms traded vary according to each source. According to UNROCA, the primary items traded were portable air defense systems (MANPADS), with sales reaching 150 units in 2022 (see Chart 1). In contrast, SIPRI data indicates that missiles were the most frequently traded arms, with a peak of 390 units sold by China in 2016 (see Chart 2). 

Chart 1

Chart 2

Strategic Implications

These arms sales are an integral part of China’s larger strategy to counterbalance India’s influence in South Asia while also trying to safeguard its interests in the Bay of Bengal, a critical chokepoint for maritime trade. The military engagements and arms transfers go hand in hand with China’s infrastructure and economic projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aimed at enhancing military cooperation and strengthening bilateral relations through investments in bridges, transportation and energy. This further concretizes China’s influential position in the regional landscape. In fact, in 2023, renewed extensive engagements between China and Bangladesh took place, especially the discussions between Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Hon’ble Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, which bolstered their Strategic Partnership of Cooperation. This meeting marked their first in-person engagement in four years and managed to not only reinvigorate the existing ties between the two nations but also deepened their commitment to each other.

Recent Developments and Geopolitical Maneuvering 

At the time of the Bangladeshi elections in 2023, China had assured support for Bangladesh's sovereignty and maintained a stance against “external interference” in an attempt to deepen diplomatic cooperation. China had also pledged to protect Bangladesh’s independence and territorial integrity to ensure the nation’s internal unity and stability. In this case, China’s stance was particularly influential and strategic, given its existing competition with India and the US. Following the recent visa ban announced by the U.S. Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, on individuals who are seen as being involved in or undermining the democratic process in Bangladesh, the relationship between US and Bangladesh had started to strain. By positioning itself as a protector of Bangladeshi sovereignty, China aimed to mitigate American influence, thereby securing for itself the role of an indispensable partner. 

Another notable military development was a $1.2 billion Chinese investment into Bangladesh's first ever submarine base in Cox’s Bazar in 2023, named after PM Sheikh Hasina, who just won her fourth consecutive term. This was a major cause of concern for India, which views the Bay of Bengal as a critical area of interest for its security, maritime, and economic ambitions. As China inches closer to Bangladesh and its military assets, the cause for India’s anxiety becomes clear. The persisting trust deficit with New Delhi, a weakened Sri Lankan economy, and political instability in Myanmar make Bangladesh the best option for China to secure its footing in South Asia today.

Since China and Bangladesh signed a defense cooperation agreement in 2002, the latter has witnessed a significant enhancement of its military capabilities. Bangladesh's acquisition of two Chinese-made 056 corvettes in 2016, BNS Shadhinota and BNS Prottoy, each equipped with weapons such as 30mm and 76mm naval guns, warships, and missile systems, further demonstrates its willingness to have China sponsor its military modernisation. Further, with the recent submarine port investments in Bangladeh, the potential for installation of other military hardware, such as anti-submarine warfare systems and advanced surveillance technologies, may be a near-term possibility. The existence of this port itself implies deepened arms and military collaboration between China and Bangladesh. 

Conclusion

The overall defense collaboration between China and Bangladesh, spanning diverse arms transactions from MANPADS to sophisticated missile systems, not only enhances Bangladesh’s military posture, but also solidifies China’s strategic interests in the Bay of Bengal. This approach, integrating economic projects like the BRI with military cooperation, aims to fortify bilateral ties and bolster China's regional influence.

To add to that, the timing of China's support—amidst Bangladesh's election cycle and tiffs with the US—highlights a deliberate and well-thought-out strategy to position itself as a dependable ally against external pressures. This positioning in response to global power shifts sets the stage for a new balance of power in South Asia – one that may not particularly be in India’s interests.

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