What is new at the BWC?

From October 2024, I have been engaged as part of a global expert panel constituted by the International Science Council (ISC) to provide recommendations for strengthening the BWC. As part of the process, I have been liaising with experts from 9 other countries virtually and attended the BWC’s Working Group meeting on 4th and 5th December in-person. A side event was hosted by ISC on 5th December to discuss the proposals from the expert panel. This blog is an analysis of where the BWC stands and the challenges it faces. 

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is at a pivotal juncture, as its member states negotiate a balance between national sovereignty and global biosecurity. In the wake of COVID-19, there is widespread recognition of the need to prioritize biosecurity and health security measures. This is evident in ongoing negotiations for a UN-led pandemic treaty and various multilateral and bilateral agreements aimed at enhancing pandemic preparedness. Biosecurity concerns have led the BWC to update its measures to keep pace with evolving technologies (biotech and associated tech such as AI) and aid less resourceful countries by providing tools to strengthen their biosecurity infrastructure. Negotiations about potential measures include setting up a compliance and verification mechanism, formulating a science and technology advisory committee, and facilitating international cooperation and assistance. 

Since its inception in 1975, the BWC has been largely successful, with no recorded instances of state-led biological warfare. It remains one of the few disarmament treaties that mandates the destruction of existing bioweapons stockpiles while prohibiting the development of new ones. However, emerging biotechnologies such as gene editing, combined with advancements in artificial intelligence, have brought fresh challenges to its enforcement. These technologies expand the potential ways biology can be weaponized and lower the barriers for non-state actors to exploit them, underscoring the need for the treaty to adapt to a rapidly evolving landscape. Although most state parties are aware of this risk, there are questions of national sovereignty that challenge the way forward. 

Key Challenges and Proposals

1. Compliance and Verification Mechanism
A major challenge for the BWC is the lack of a system to verify whether signatory states are adhering to its provisions. Past attempts, including efforts by a scientific expert committee and a political ad hoc committees, failed to establish a consensus on verification. One significant roadblock is the fear that on-site inspections of biotechnology companies could be misused to access proprietary information, potentially impacting intellectual property and the economic value of such companies. Additionally, concerns about intrusive measures, such as sharing internal data or vulnerabilities, have further complicated negotiations.

Despite these challenges, there is now broad agreement within the BWC Working Group that a verification mechanism is essential.

2. Science and Technology Advisory Committee
The proposal for a science and technology advisory mechanism has sparked debate over its structure and operation. Current suggestions include a two-tiered approach:

• A core group of experts nominated by state parties, tasked with technical analysis.

• A larger group of political representatives from all signatory states, responsible for translating expert input into actionable steps.

This mechanism must account for the rapid pace of technological advancements. Regular horizon scanning for emerging biothreats will be a critical function, requiring expertise not only in biotechnology but also in other fields like AI and cybersecurity. Importantly, this mechanism must be agile, proactive, and adaptive, ensuring ongoing updates rather than one-time assessments. Yet, the mandate of this mechanism is not clear at the moment and requires more attention. 

3. International Cooperation and Assistance Mechanism (ICA)
The ICA aims to help less-resourced countries strengthen their biosecurity capabilities. However, disagreements persist over its scope. There are concerns that countries may exploit the ICA to gain access to economically valuable technologies for commercial purposes rather than biosecurity.

One potential solution is to tier the activities funded under the ICA, ensuring a focus on biosecurity while safeguarding intellectual property. Currently the BWC operates on trust between state parties that is supported by these parties sharing data on relevant activities through confidence building measures. One way to operationalise ICA, would be to strengthen this reporting across all countries,  and using the reported data to identify capacity deficiencies that can be further supported. 

The Funding Gap

A key issue that is not a primary consideration in these discussions is funding. Historically, the BWC has been underfunded, and implementing new mechanisms or capacity-building programs will require significant financial resources.The benefits of these mechanisms have to commensurate with the cost. While there is political consensus on the need for these mechanisms, this must translate into concrete commitments from member states to adequately fund the treaty.

Looking Ahead

There is cautious optimism that the BWC can implement much-needed updates, but critical challenges remain, particularly around defining the specifics of proposed measures and addressing the funding gap. The next sessions of the working group planned for August and December 2025, should bring in more clarity. Above all else, bioweapons are an existential threat to humanity. Addressing this threat requires a science-driven approach. The BWC’s success in navigating these challenges will determine its ability to safeguard global biosecurity in the decades to come. 

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