Why the Russia-North Korea Treaty may not be in India’s Interests

During a recent visit by the Russian President Vladimir Putin to Pyongyang to meet North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong-un, the two sides concluded a landmark agreement to formalise their military-strategic relationship. Titled the ‘Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the DPRK and the Russian Federation’, the agreement between two nations has spurred speculation as to its potential impacts for regional and global security. However, a discussion of its impacts on India is missing.

This is concerning because when one peruses the contents of the Treaty, one can infer that its various provisions run contrary to India's vision for the world order. In the very preamble of the Treaty, Russia and North Korea affirm that their joint goal is to build a “new, fair and equal international order,” and in doing so, aspire for “global stability.” Contemporary geopolitics is increasingly witnessing the emergence of a Russia-China axis founded on a sentiment of anti-Westernism, and important partners of the two countries, such as Iran and North Korea, are being co-opted into the axis. Given that India often positions itself as a bridge and a balancer between Russia and the US-led West, such an axis portends to create a power dynamic that would be simply unacceptable to India’s strategic goals. 

India’s foreign policy outlook is built not on anti-Westernism but on multi-alignment, and with Russia’s treaty alignment with North Korea, India may find itself in a difficult position balancing its individual relations and interests vis-a-vis Russia and the West. Moreover, a Russia-China-North Korea-Iran axis chips away at India’s strategic space, depriving it of opportunities to shape regional geopolitics in its favour. This may especially play out in the deliberations at platforms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, where aligned foreign policy visions of other parties may leave India isolated.

Secondly, the highlight of the Russia-North Korea Treaty, which is enshrined in articles 3 and 4, poses a security challenge to India, as it does to other regional countries. As per the articles, the two countries have agreed to come to each other’s aid in case of a “state of war [caused] by armed invasion,” and discuss “feasible practical measures” to ensure “mutual assistance” even when there only exists a “threat” of armed invasion. As two countries that are engaged in conflict currently, the grounds for declaration of such a threat are quite vague, especially considering Russia has even referred to the eastward expansion of NATO as threatening invasion and war. In this context, “practical measures” may even mean military-technical trade and nuclear support. 

Under the United Nations Security Council sanctions regime, weapons trade with North Korea is prohibited, and persons affiliated with or enabling its nuclearisation can have their assets frozen by countries across the world. This is particularly significant from India’s perspective. As per an amended order on implementation of UNSC sanctions against North Korea issued by the Ministry of External Affairs in 2021, individuals and enterprises enabling North Korea’s ballistic missile programme (designated under UNSC list 1718) are banned from cultivating assets in or travelling to India. In all, India has been a vehement critic of North Korean nuclearisation and has supported UN-centered mechanisms to prevent it.

On the contrary, even though the Treaty bases itself on respect for UN-led international norms and laws, it is a known fact that both Russia and North Korea have violated the UNSC sanctions regime by trading in munitions. The former is even reported to have imported artillery shells from the latter to enable its war in Ukraine. And it is precisely this dichotomy in actions of India and Russia that may create tensions in how both countries approach the UNSC and its sanctions regime. Further, given that India hopes to create a reformed multilateral order where other countries such as itself have a permanent seat in the UNSC, Russia’s violative actions should concern India. In this light, the real test of Indian diplomacy would be to both maintain its friendship with Russia, while also seeking a reformed UNSC without condemning Russia, without exuding hypocrisy.

Finally, the enactment of this Treaty is likely to add another stressor in the already increasingly tricky India-US equation. There are already signs of misgivings on a range of issues between the two sides. Messages critical of India’s approach are already rolling in as Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Moscow to meet Putin coincided with NATO’s 75th anniversary Summit. US Ambassador to India, Eric Garcetti, has been blunt that the India-US relationship is not deep enough yet to be taken for granted. As India and the US find a common challenge in China, their relationship has become more enhanced, in that both joint military production and technological exchange endeavours are taking flight. And even though both sides have mutual gains to find in a deeper partnership, there is little yet to suggest that the relationship is interdependent.

India’s strategic ambivalence over the Russia-North Korea Treaty, therefore, might turn out to be detrimental to its interests, given that the relationship with the US remains critical to India’s aspirations. In fact, it is evident from the Summit declaration reached by NATO countries on July 10, that they see Russia as “the most significant and direct” threat to their security. In this regard, if India wishes that the US be more appreciative of the severe nature of challenge India faces from China, sooner or later, it will likely have to respond in kind by acknowledging how Russia and its various alliances are a significant challenge for the US and NATO.

With the Treaty in place, increased NATO involvement in Indo-Pacific affairs is imminent. From both the Indian and Russian perspectives, such an environment will augur enhanced securitisation of regional geopolitics and significantly reduce room for strategic manoeuvre. In this regard, if India is willing to prioritise its interests above all else, bilaterally deliberating the negative consequences of Russia’s move vis-à-vis North Korea is vital. After all, the establishment of ‘red lines’ and open lines of communication is key for diplomatic success.

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