The Diplomat | Zelenskyy Finally Calls out China’s Role in Russia’s War on Ukraine

For far too long, Ukraine has treaded carefully around China’s role in the ongoing war with Russia. Despite mounting evidence of Beijing’s support for Moscow, both materially and diplomatically, Kyiv has been reluctant to criticize China directly. However, during the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy finally broke his silence, openly accusing China of aiding Russia in undermining peace efforts.  Read the full article here.

The Diplomat | Playing the Long Game: Ukraine’s Approach to China

Multiple news articles report Beijing snubbing Ukraine during the recent World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting in Switzerland, with Chinese Premier Li Qiang refusing to meet Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. In response, Zelenskyy clarified that he never wanted to meet Li, suggesting that the latter was not high-ranking enough to be worth meeting. “There is a Chinese premier – then our prime minister will meet with him. I would love to meet with the leader of China,” the Ukrainian president said. “As far as I know, [in China] Xi Jinping makes decisions, and in Ukraine, I make decisions. I don’t need just any dialogues; I need important decisions from the leaders who make these decisions.” Read the full article here.

India can play bigger role in global nuclear politics. Ukraine fence-sitting stands in way

In war, strategic contestation may not easily knuckle under the passing winds of tactical successes and defeats. The problem is always about judging the flow so that informed decisions can be made on how much and in what manner should force be applied. The Russians have used artillery and missile firepower to devastate Ukrainian resistance and taken control of nearly the entire Donbas region. An uneasy tactical pause is occupying the stage and the contours of a protracted conflict are discernible.

100 Days of Russia-Ukraine conflict: How China's Choices have Damaged its External Environment

Earlier this week, a lengthy front page commentary in the People’s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship newspaper, bemoaned the deterioration of China’s external environment. The author warned that following the war in Ukraine, “instability, uncertainty and insecurity” were on the rise, and that the West, led by the US, was doubling down on policies aimed at “containing and suppressing” China. Although the author called for focus on running internal affairs well and dismissed external factors as not being “decisive” in China’s pursuit of its goal of national rejuvenation, the assessment does reveal how deeply the war in Ukraine has adversely affected China’s strategic interests.

The Cascading Effects of Chip Starvation to Russia

The US and its allies like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Netherlands enjoy an elevated status in the global high-tech sphere. Much of the world’s production capacity and intellectual property (IP) related to micro-electronic and semiconductors chips are concentrated in the territory of the US and its allies. This strategic high-tech dominance ensures that the US can inflict major costs on adversarial countries like Russia and China and their economies. It is clear that the recently imposed sanctions and export controls on Russia and the resultant chip starvation will have increasingly detrimental effects on the Russian economy. With no hope to import chips legally, Moscow may turn to gray imports and smuggling.

Divide Forex Reserve Into Two Components

The United States (US), European Union (EU) and several countries have imposed a raft of punitive measures on Russia for invading Ukraine. One of the more serious forms of sanctions has been the freezing of the Russian central bank’s assets held in foreign-denominated currencies. When a country earns more foreign exchange (forex) than it spends, it moves the surplus into its reserve account for future contingencies. These reserves are not held in physical currency, but in different forms of financial assets such as gold and debt instruments (bonds and bills) of foreign governments. Countries prefer to invest in currencies that are liquid (easily convertible), widely accepted and trustworthy. The US dollar fits all these criteria.

Our Geo-economic Interests Lie with the West as Well as the Rest

Over the past few weeks, I discovered a marked difference in attitudes towards the Ukraine war between those of my friends who had spent time in the New Delhi establishment and those who hadn’t. The Delhiwaalas—diplomats, economists, journalists and veterans—were more likely to argue that reports of Russian losses were part of information operations, the West was to blame for provoking Vladimir Putin, we depend on Moscow for critical defence equipment, and that India ought not take any position that would hurt Russia. This was the case across the political and ideological divide: as long as they were Delhiwaalas, they more or less held this view. I was thus not surprised when opposition parties mirrored the government’s position on this issue, revealing a rare non-partisan consensus in these polarized times.

Atmashakti Over Atmanirbharta: Learn Right Lessons from Russia Sanctions

Confirmation bias is the tendency to search for information that confirms one’s preconceptions. This bias is visible in the Indian debates on technology following the West’s stringent export controls restricting the Russian state’s access to cutting-edge technology.

Some tech companies have gone far beyond the remit of these controls, suspending their operations or restricting access to Russian citizens. For those who seek tech self-sufficiency, this war appears to bolster their case for everything from data localisation to domestic social media platforms and home-made drones.

The Effect Of Tech Sanctions On The Russian Economy

During the course of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis, the West (mainly the United States and its NATO allies) have been looking at deterrence mechanisms to curtail Russia's continuous military offensives. The current actions taken against Russia have mainly been in the form of targeting the Russian economy through sanctions and embargoes specifically targeting sectors that Russia relies on for export revenues. The recent announcement by President Joe Biden on banning Russian oil, gas, and energy imports to the US is just one of the decisions that are hitting the core of the economy. But, the US, has also specifically introduced high-tech sanctions mainly depriving Russia the access to critical technologies (like semiconductors, quantum, artificial intelligence, and big data) and their applications. 

How Western MNCs Weakened Globalisation by Taking Sides

The closing of McDonald’s in Moscow is bad news for the global economy. Whatever the military outcomes of Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine, its geo-economic consequences are negative for just about every country on the planet. Even if major economies manage to absorb some of the immediate shocks created by disruptions and sanctions, the global response to the war will shift public policies around the world in a regressive direction. I hope McDonald’s exit from Russia does not mark the end of a period of global growth and prosperity—India’s included—that began with the arrival of the golden arches at Moscow’s Pushkin Square in January 1990. But I fear it does.

India’s Aloof Response to the Ukraine Crisis

Read the Full Text on East Asia Forum

By: Artyom Lukin, Far Eastern Federal University and Aditya Pareek, Takshashila Institution

Moscow’s decision to recognise the Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republics and then launch a ‘special military operation’ in Ukraine has created a tricky balancing act for India. Delhi’s immediate reaction to the crisis has been restrained, neutral and focused on ensuring the safety of its nationals inside Ukraine.
Several hours after Russian military action was underway, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Modi urged that all violence should be ceased immediately and reiterated India’s emphasis on diplomacy and ‘honest and sincere dialogue’ between Russia and NATO.

On 26 February 2022, the United Nations Security Council held a vote on a resolution demanding that Moscow immediately stop its attack on Ukraine and withdraw all troops. India was among the three countries to abstain, along with China and the United Arab Emirates. India’s UN envoy expressed his ‘regret that the path of diplomacy was given up’. India also abstained on a procedural resolution to call for an emergency session of the UN General Assembly.

Modi also held a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in which he expressed ‘his deep anguish about the loss of lives and properties’ but refrained from directly criticising Russia.

The India–Russia relationship is officially characterised as a ‘special and privileged strategic partnership’. The entente between Moscow and Delhi dates back decades. Though the bond is no longer the de facto alliance it once was in the 1970s and 1980s, Moscow remains Delhi’s an important strategic partner, on par with the United States. The two nations don’t have any significant areas of disagreement and both share a fundamental interest in a multipolar balance of power in Eurasia.

India relies on Russia for the majority of its imported military equipment, nuclear submarine technology and some vital space faring technology. A highlight of India–Russian defence cooperation has been the US$5.43 billion deal for the S-400 air defence system, which Russia began delivering in December 2021. Russian-made weapons are critical to India’s ability to counter its main external threat — China.

There are also perhaps ideational factors behind India’s reluctance to censure Russian actions toward Ukraine. The conflict over Ukraine may have some parallels with India’s historic traumas. The fragmentation of the Soviet Union that led to the birth of an independent Ukraine was not dissimilar to the partition of the British Raj, which produced India and Pakistan, two culturally close but still antagonistic entities. Putin characterises the modern state of Ukraine in antagonistic terms as an ‘anti-Russia’ project.

Western powers portray the conflict as a struggle between an imperialistic autocracy and a young democracy, but Delhi may not buy this narrative. India has always been somewhat sceptical about the US-led discourse on liberal democracy. This remains the case despite the Westernisation of Indian elites. Under Modi, India has been evolving in an illiberal and ethno-nationalistic direction. It is an open secret that India wants to maintain its sphere of influence in parts of South Asia.

India does not have many significant security interests in Europe, which helps explain its relative aloofness to the Ukraine crisis. But Delhi does have some stakes in Ukraine. For instance, the Indian Space Research Organisation’s semi cryogenic engine is being developed based on Ukrainian supplied RD-810 designs and many Indian navy warships depend on Ukrainian gas turbines, including those under construction at Russian shipyards. So India has a national security stake in not alienating Ukraine.

Another reason for India’s repeated calls for the cessation of violence, de-escalation and resolving the situation through diplomacy is high energy prices, which may negatively affect India’s stressed economy.

The Role of Space in the Russia-Ukraine War

An escalation in space could cost more Ukrainian lives and leave Russian forces blind

The Russian special military operation launched against Ukraine is raging. Much of the action by forces on both sides is observable on land, in the air, amritime and cyber domains. curiously few – if any- details are emerging about the role of outer space in the conflict.

Ukraine War Won’t Affect Global Semiconductor Supply, But Will Hit Russia Hard

With the world still reeling from a global chip shortage, the recent crisis in Ukraine sends a bleak message to the already floundering industry. The semiconductor chip supply is yet to recover from the shock dealt by the COVID-19 pandemic. This, coupled with an impending war between two states that are contributors to the global supply chain, is detrimental to the industry’s recovery. The consumer electronics and automotive markets have been massively hit by this chip shortage. Apple, a major manufacturer of mobile phones and laptops, has pushed the release of their new line of MacBook and announced that the number of iPhone models being manufactured would be reduced due to the chip shortage. The automotive sector is still underperforming and major players have yet to resume operations at pre-pandemic levels. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia might have some implications on the global chip supply along with consequences for the Russian semiconductor industry itself.

India can work around Russia’s SWIFT expulsion. But there may be geopolitical costs

One of the most severe Western sanctions on Russia is freezing the Russian central bank’s assets held abroad. Russia has $630 billion in foreign exchange reserves. However, more than $300 billion worth of assets are held abroad in the Federal Reserve (US central bank) and the European Central Bank (ECB). Cutting off access to these funds to Russia can be a mighty blow.

The other big action underway is excluding Russian banks from the SWIFT network, which facilitates international payments. SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) is a global messaging system that allows banks to communicate with each other in a secure manner, enabling safe transfer of funds. Based in Belgium and jointly owned by 2,000 banks and financial institutions, it is the underlying technology that enables global payments and has 11,000 international banks as members.

Cutting Russia Off SWIFT Could Accelerate Beijing-Moscow Alternative Payments System

On February 24, the United Kingdom (UK) announced its “largest-ever” economic sanctions on Russia, and so did the United States (US). As the sanctions get stricter, shared economic interests and geopolitical considerations are likely to deepen economic relations between Beijing and Moscow, including the prospect of building an alternative financial system.

The signs of deepening Russia-China economic relations are evident. In an interview with a Russian newspaper amidst Russia’s recognition of rebel-held regions in Eastern Ukraine, China’s ambassador to Russia, Zhang Hanhui, spoke about possibilities of furthering cooperation between Moscow and Beijing, especially in energy, space, financial cooperation, and high-tech weapons systems. These are also the sectors targeted in the recent round of sanctions by the UK and the US. This is explicit signalling by Beijing of its support for Moscow.

Russia, The West, And The Info War

Fears of war breaking out between Russia and Ukraine have dominated headlines in the international press. Information warfare is an undeniable reality of modern conflicts, and its impact is often strategic in demoralizing the adversary’s forces and populace.

In many of its doctrinal and strategic publications, Russia acknowledges that the information domain is an active battleground, regardless of the contending sides being in a state of war or peace. Despite spirited official denials, it is fair to say that Russia gives as good as it gets in the information domain.

In the latest round of public jousting around hybrid and information warfare, both sides have led with accusations and official public statements.

The Russian Ministry of Defense has alleged that American mercenaries are present and looking to orchestrate a chemical attack in the Donbas region of Ukraine. Meanwhile the US State Department has released a fact sheet detailing the alleged Russian “destabilization campaign in Ukraine.” British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss has made a statement accusing Russia of planning “to install pro-Russian leadership in Ukraine.”

Russia’s approach to building up forces on Ukraine’s border is best characterized as Clausewitzian, meaning it’s aimed toward achieving political goals through other means.