Science and State Power in China

In May 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping placed an ambitious proposition before the leaders of the country’s scientific community. He called on them to “aim for the frontiers of science and technology” and emerge as the “vanguards in innovation in the new era.” The overarching objective, he said, was for China to become a “major world centre for science and innovation.” This, for Xi, is one of the “responsibilities bestowed by history” upon China’s scientific community. For him, the development of science and technology is a strategic imperative. It’s what will drive future growth and ensure China’s security, overall competitiveness and global standing.At the heart of Xi’s emphasis on and investment in science and technology, therefore, is the goal of enhancing state power. This perspective is not exclusive to the current Chinese leadership. It is the product of historical debate over the role of science and technology in Chinese society. The origins of this conversation can be dated back to the last few decades of the Qing Dynasty, which ended in 1912. Since then, while strengthening state power has remained the core objective of the pursuit of scientific advancement, each generation of leaders has adopted a different pathway. [Read More...]

Understanding China’s LAC deployment capabilities

Broadening of the India-China standoff into multiple theatres will present formidable challenges for Chinese forcesAll eyes are on the meeting between Indian external affairs minister S Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart on September 10 in Moscow, nevertheless, it has increasingly become clear over the past few weeks that the two countries are preparing for a...The article was originally published in Deccan Herald.

Xi’s new approach to Tibet will affect India

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent remarks at the seventh Central Symposium on Tibet Work indicate that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is doubling down on its hardline approach in the region, which evolved gradually after the 2008 protests.The strategy for the next few years that Xi outlined entails a mix of persuasion, development, connectivity, indoctrination and coercion. This will not only have serious implications for ordinary Tibetans but will also impinge on the Sino-Indian boundary question, particularly in the context of China’s claims on Arunachal Pradesh.Read the full article in Hindustan Times.

What is driving China’s aggression?

There has been growing debate in recent times in India and other countries about China’s aggression. What’s driving Beijing to engage in contests on multiple fronts, be it Hong Kong, the near seas, or India, particularly amid a pandemic and economic weakness? Is it opportunism? Is it hubris? Is internal turmoil and insecurity leading to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) lashing out? Or are there structural factors that one must consider?Read the full article in The Hindustan Times.

Arriving at a new normal in India-China relations

This article was first published in The Hindustan Times.The ongoing stand-off between the Indian and Chinese forces in eastern Ladakh is a fork in the road, fundamentally reshaping the direction of the bilateral relationship. Over the last few years, the architects of the gradual thaw and developing partnership between the two sides, which began in 1988, had been warning about the withering of old mechanisms that had kept the peace on the disputed boundary.Despite the pageantry of informal summitry, the strategic guidance provided by the leaders to their respective militaries has clearly not succeeded in stemming incidents. In November 2019, the minister of state for defence, Shripad Naik, told Parliament that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had transgressed into Indian territory 1,025 times between 2016 and 2018. Roughly a third of these incidents took place in 2018. In April that year, Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping held the first of their two informal summits. Recent reports suggest that the number of transgressions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) increased significantly in 2019.

Xi’s Strategic Folly: Why a New National Security Law Highlights China’s Insecurities

This article was first published in The Diplomat.Xi Jinping’s move reflects Beijing’s insecurities over Hong KongLast week was among the most critical in Hong Kong’s history since the 1997 handover of the territory to the People’s Republic of China. On Thursday, the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s top legislature, approved a draft decision to pursue enacting new national security legislation by a vote of 2,878-1, at its annual session in Beijing, with six abstentions. Over the past few days, there’s been a spate of demonstrations and crackdowns in the city amid concerns that the new legislation would be the end of Hong Kong’s autonomy.

Coronavirus economic crisis squeezes China’s plans to expand its navy as it marks 71st anniversary

China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy marks its 71st anniversary today. It comes amid intensified drills in the near seas and Western Pacific, along with deepening tensions in the South China Sea. The navy has been one of the biggest beneficiaries of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s military reforms.Driven by great power ambitions, Chinese naval shipbuilders have been churning out warships at a record pace over the past few years. Consequently, the Chinese navy today has the world’s largest deployable fleet of vessels. The irony, however, is that in the post-Covid-19 world, this expansion could prove to be the navy’s Achilles' heel.Read the full article in South China Morning Post

COVID-19 & China: Crisis to opportunity

Three events last week underscore how the narrative has shifted around China’s handling of the COVID-19 outbreak. The first of these is Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Wuhan, which coincided with the country’s health authorities confirming that the outbreak had peaked there. Second, the World Health Organisation’s declaration of Covid-19 as a pandemic for which the epicentre had shifted to Europe. And third, the Donald Trump administration’s initial ham-handed response to the outbreak in the US.Read the full article in Deccan Herald here

Expect China to intensify pressure campaign after Tsai Ing-wen’s victory

Cross-strait ties are likely to get far more frosty, with serious implications for the security dynamic in East Asia, after Tsai Ing-wen’s victory in Taiwan’s presidential election.In many ways, Saturday’s was a historic election. Nearly 75 percent of the 19.31 million eligible voters cast their ballot, with Tsai bagging over 57 percent of the vote. Her nearest rival, the Kuomintang’s (KMT) Han Kuo-yu, could only manage 38.6 percent of the vote. Also elected were 113 new members to Taiwan’s legislature, the Legislative Yuan. Tsai’s pro-independence leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lost seven seats in the legislature but managed to retain its majority, winning 61. The KMT, on the other hand, gained three seats, increasing its 2016 tally to 38.Read the full article in The Indian Express.

Your Fitbit is Going to Replace Clinics near You

First, it was payments and now it’s healthcare. Big Tech in the US and China is revolutionising the health sector, with hundreds of billions of dollars of market share at stake. There are multiple factors that are driving this movement. For starters, there’s the simple need to find new avenues for growth for both American and Chinese tech giants, and there are only so many trillion-dollar industries to disrupt to add shareholder value. China has more reasons and more at stake here. Both countries boast of high levels of internet penetration and smartphone use. Both the US and China are rapidly aging societies. This implies a growing geriatric healthcare burden and creates incentives for new alternatives to overcrowded hospitals. Both are home to a wealthy middle class, which is seeking better health solutions. According to Royal Philips’ Future Health Index 2019, both the US and China are global frontrunners in terms of adoption of digital health technology, with a large number of medical professionals and consumers relying on tools for self-monitoring and online consultations. This is a key contributor to their rise in demand for wearables. This is supported by and fuels their dynamic and thriving innovation ecosystems. This explains why American and Chinese companies are making moves in healthcare based on their core competencies. Recently, Amazon backed on its software to move into telemedicine and also invited healthcare companies to build tools on Alexa’s platform. Amazon’s core competence, however, is its efficiency in distribution networks. So the e-commerce giant acquired Pillpack, an online pharmacy. The Alibaba Group, on the other hand, entered the healthcare game early with its TMall Pharmacy in 2015. However, in 2018, Alibaba consolidated its healthcare assets, including medical devices, e-appointments, drug purchases, and delivery services under the banner of Alibaba Health, which leverages the group’s advantages in data processing and e-commerce. Another big Chinese player in the field is Tencent, which owns WeDoctor, one of the world’s biggest health tech start-ups. Google is great at data analytics and OS development. Keep that in mind and Project Nightingale begins to make sense. As does Google’s $2.1 billion acquisition of Fitbit. Google’s Chinese search counterpart Baidu has bounced back after a 2016 controversy over healthcare ads to explore the possibility of leveraging artificial intelligence and blockchain technology for its medical data sharing and distribution solution. Meanwhile, Apple excels in devices that track wellness. Think Apple Watch and the electrocardiogram that comes installed on it. Or the dedicated carekit and researchkit open-source frameworks that Apple has been pushing recently for developers. IDC data for 2018 show that while Apple is the market leader in the wearables segment, Chinese firms Xiaomi and Huawei take the second and third spots, respectively. Their global ranking is buttressed by their dominance in the Chinese and Indian markets. So what does the future of the health tech sector look like? We predict three scenarios that we believe will play out over the next five years: First, wearables will become the new OPDs: With Big Tech investing in healthcare across Silicon Valley, Zhongguancun, and Shenzhen wearables and telemedicine have a bright present and future in their diagnostic capabilities. Recording pulse or temperature, scanning bones or tissues, diagnosing based on those, and getting medicines have become or are becoming tasks that can be worked upon remotely or be delivered to you. Over the coming decade, wearables will reliably send accurate data in real-time to process for millions of people. This would give them a decisive advantage over the number of people physical OPDs can carter to, making the latter obsolete.  Second, tech giants will dominate health & life insurance: Wearables and smartphones are becoming increasingly sophisticated in diagnostic capabilities and tracking. As that continues to happen with every new iteration of FitBits and the Apple Watches, the OS becomes a platform for companies to sell services and gain revenue. WatchOS and WearOS (and/or what future FitBit OS is going to be called), are likely to go on to sell insurance through their devices. Whether Google/Apple curate a new insurance policy or end up acquiring an insurance company to do it for them is irrelevant. Considering that insurance is a lucrative market, and that data from the apps in the OS gives Google/Apple a comparative advantage means that it is the matter of when, not if, for both tech giants to start peddling their own insurance through the OS on smartphones or wearables. Third, Sino-US rivalry will stymie health tech’s future growth: The deepening strategic rivalry between the US and China has already shifted from competition over trade policies to a battle for technological supremacy. This is playing out in the form of expanding the definition of sensitive technologies that must be protected, tighter security reviews of Chinese tech investments, undoing of completed acquisitions, blacklisting of certain firms, export restrictions and a contest for foreign markets and data streams. Much of this is captured in the geopolitically charged discourse over Huawei and 5G. The health tech industry can expect a similarly rocky future. Collaboration between research communities and business entities across the Pacific will be difficult. Acquisitions in foreign markets are likely to become a politically polarising decision. Capital flows into each other’s health tech ecosystems will become increasingly constrained. Data will become the biggest sticking point, with most states preferring some form of localization.

How to respond to an 'intelligent' PLA

Advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies over the next decade will have a profound impact on the nature of warfare. Increasing use of precision weapons, training simulations and unmanned vehicles are merely the tip of the iceberg. AI technologies, going forward, will not only have a direct battlefield impact in terms of weapons and equipment but will also impact planning, logistics and decision-making, requiring new ethical and doctrinal thinking. From an Indian perspective, China’s strategic focus on leveraging AI has serious national security implications.Read the full article on the Deccan Herald website.

What can Modi-Xi agree on to call their Mamallapuram meeting a success?

The Print’s daily roundtable TalkPoint posed a question connected to the Narendra Modi-Xi Jinping informal summit in Mamallapuram: What can Modi-Xi agree on to call their Mamallapuram meeting a success?Manoj Kewalramani, Fellow-China Studies at The Takshashila Institution, was among the discussants. Manoj argued:My expectations from the Modi-Xi summit are very low for mainly two reasons. First, it is essentially an informal summit with no clearly-defined agenda, therefore, there will be only a few concrete outcomes from the meet. Second relates to the situation between the two countries on fundamental issues in the last 6-8 months.China has been very slow to move on issues important to India such as membership in the United Nations Security Council or the Nuclear Suppliers Group. And it also took the Kashmir issue to the UN where it has zero locus standi. Even trade relations between India and China have been strained. So, the current environment is not conducive to this summit. However, it is always a good idea to keep engaging in dialogue.To call this meeting a success, Modi and Xi must arrive at the conclusion that both India and China are rising powers and not let their differences turn into disputes. Regarding the border issue, the best-case scenario would be a discussion on new confidence-building measures between the militaries of both countries to maintain peace and tranquillity. I see no concrete direction on trade besides the broad rhetoric on the matter. What one can also expect is people-to-people contact and talk about fostering a cultural relationship between the two ancient civilisations to ensure that India-China relations are organic as opposed to only being diplomatically driven by leaders at the top.Read the entire discussion on ThePrint.in website here.

Modi-Xi Summit: Don't expect a major breakthrough

While India and China will hold the second informal summit between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping today and tomorrow, events over the past few weeks have dampened the prospects of forward movement on the boundary dispute. The first informal summit between Xi and Modi in Wuhan in 2018 had provided a tentative new template for first stabilising and then advancing the bilateral relationship, which had come under increasing strain.Read the full article in Deccan Herald here

Why Xi won’t be sending the PLA to quell Hong Kong protests

The eleven-week-long protest movement in Hong Kong has reached a critical phase. Earlier this week, thousands of protesters converged on the city’s airport, paralysing operations and disrupting nearly 1,000 flights. The airport was finally cleared on Thursday after clashes between riot police and the protesters. The scenes of chaos played out as the top leadership of the Communist Party of China met for its annual conclave at the beachside town of Beidaihe.The situation in Hong Kong undoubtedly must have been on top of the agenda. The protests, which initially focussed on an extradition bill put forward by the city’s government, have now evolved into a larger battle for autonomy from Beijing’s tightening grip. In the process, peaceful demonstrations have given way to anger and violence.These turns of events indicate an increasing sense of unease that Beijing is now seriously contemplating the use of force. This, of course, remains a possibility. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region empowers local authorities to request Beijing for such assistance. The PLA, in fact, already has troops stationed at a garrison in Hong Kong. However, given the current scenario, it is highly unlikely that Xi will deploy the armed forces to quell the protests.Read the full article published in The Hindu

What does China’s new defence strategy mean?

China on Wednesday published its first defence white paper in four years, outlining the strategic military guideline for what it terms as a new era. The document offers an insight into Beijing’s view of the changes in the international security situation. It discusses China’s defence policy objectives, along with the reform, missions and tasks that its armed forces are undertaking. Further, it elaborates on the role of the armed forces in the broader Chinese geopolitical objective of establishing a community with a shared future for mankind. Here are five key takeaways from the white paper. The line taken by the document indicates a generally positive outlook towards India. Nevertheless, there are certain potential points of impact to be noted from the perspective of Indian interests.Shifting Balance of PowerThe white paper begins with an assessment of the changes in the international security environment. It argues that the world is increasingly heading towards multipolarity. But, it isn't yet a “tranquil place,” with strategic competition on the rise. Beijing’s diagnosis is that “the configuration of strategic power is becoming more balanced,” with the strength of emerging markets and developing countries growing. The big threat to this is the change in American policy, i.e., “growing hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism”.This necessitates a reinforcement of the UN’s role in global security, strengthening new regional security arrangements, establishing security partnerships (with Russia, for instance), investments in better weapons and technological upgrades and bolstering arms control and non-proliferation regimes. For New Delhi, which has been working on getting Beijing to yield on its admission to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the white paper’s assessment of the international non-proliferation regime as “compromised by pragmatism and double standards” is likely to be troubling.The Asia-Pacific ContestThe document observes that while the Asia-Pacific region is “generally stable”, there is increased “major country competition”. Essentially, it perceives the dynamics in the region within the framework of U.S.-China. frictions. The U.S., it argues, “is strengthening its Asia-Pacific military alliances and reinforcing military deployment and intervention”. The key partners for Washington that it identifies are South Korea, Japan and Australia. Despite that, the document largely assesses Chinese neighbourhood policy as having been successful.“Asia-Pacific countries are increasingly aware that they are members of a community with shared destiny”, it reads, hinting at the rapid emergence of a China-led security architecture. The constituents of this Sinosphere are structures like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, CICA, China’s expanding dominance in the South China Sea, dialogues with ASEAN members, regional counter-terror action and increasing bilateral military-to-military diplomacy. Interestingly, China views South Asia also as “generally stable,” although “conflicts between India and Pakistan flare up from time to time.” This suggests that Beijing is rather confident about its ability to manage tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad.BRI's Military ComponentEver since Xi Jinping launched, in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), there has been much debate about the security implications of Chinese investments around the world. The white paper tells us that protecting China’s overseas interests is a strategic objective for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It states that “one of the missions of China’s armed forces is to effectively protect the security and legitimate rights and interests of overseas Chinese people, organisations and institutions”. In order to do so, the document says that the PLA is building “far seas forces”, “overseas logistical facilities”, and capabilities for “diversified military tasks”. That’s followed by a glowing evaluation of the PLA’s Logistics Support Base in Djibouti, which was set up in 2017. This is perhaps the clearest admission of the emerging military component of the BRI. But that’s not all. Beijing is also likely to continue to invest in and focus on participation in Humanitarian and Disaster Relief operations internationally. This is couched within the rhetoric of providing international public goods. But such activities allow for the enhancement of Chinese forces’ operational skills and experience and normalises their presence in far-flung regions of the world.Resilient ChinaThe 2015 Chinese defence white paper had argued that “China faces a formidable task to maintain political security and social stability” while discussing Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet. In 2019, there’s a mention of “external separatist forces” with regard to Tibet and Xinjiang. But the forces seeking Taiwan’s “independence” are identified as the “gravest immediate threat”, with the use of force not being ruled out. Despite that, generally, the domestic security environment is assessed to have improved considerably. “China continues to enjoy political stability, ethnic unity and social stability. There has been a notable increase in China’s overall national strength, global influence, and resilience to risks,” the white paper says. However, it is also worth noting that “safeguarding national political security” and political work in the armed forces to uphold Xi Jinping’s status as the core of the Party-state system remain priorities.Quality and Efficiency

Arguably one of the most important components of the reforms that Xi has pursued has been the restructuring of the country’s armed forces. The white paper encapsulates this as the PLA striving to transform itself from a quantity-and-scale model to that of quality and efficiency. This entails a shift in focus from manpower to firepower and from personnel-intensive to science and technology-intensive forces, according to the white paper. The impact of this overarching shift in approach has meant organisational restructuring. That has involved a shift in the balance of different forces. Over the past few years, there has been a reduction in personnel numbers, particularly from the ground forces. The Second Artillery Force has been reconstituted as the PLA Rocket Force. New strategic support and logistics forces have been established. Greater attention has been paid to safeguarding interests in outer space, electromagnetic space and cyberspace. The white paper, in fact, identifies this as one of the nine fundamental goals of the PLA going forward. Its equipment-development policy and approach to combat, therefore, are evolving from mechanisation to “intelligentised warfare” and “informatisation”. That has led to a reassessment of training methods to ensure greater interoperability among forces. These are developments that New Delhi should be watching closely and factoring into its defence planning, given that they have a direct impact on India’s security interests.

This article was first published in The Hindu. Views are personal.

Why India needs to leverage and not localise data

If one were to chart the arc of geopolitical competition over the past 100 years, one can identify four primary sources of contention – land, people, natural resources, and now, the commanding heights of new technologies. At the heart of the current competition lies data – the fuel that will power future innovation.

We generate data just by existing. Every telephone call we make, every social media share, a journey from home to work, financial transactions, and even the beat of your heart is data. This is valuable to corporations big and small looking to create new products and offer new solutions. The more data you have and the better quality data you have, the greater your chances of tailoring products, out-innovating competitors, and achieving scale.

It’s little wonder then that access to data has become a point of geopolitical contention. This was evident at the recent G20 summit in Osaka. India boycotted a move by the world’s leading economies to establish a new regime for global data governance. The Osaka Track, as it is called, is a plurilateral initiative to establish a framework for cross-border data sharing, essentially aimed at limiting a states’ ability to hoard data generated within its borders.

This goes against India’s stated policy. India boycotted the Osaka Track preferring the conversation to be held at the WTO. Foreign Secretary, Vijay Gokhale, also underscored the significance of data as “national wealth.” India’s approach has been that of data localisation. Localisation essentially means storing domestic data on domestic soil. India’s rationale for pursuing localisation comes from the notion of viewing data as a new form of wealth. Keeping this in mind, there is a strong sentiment across the government to internalise this wealth and use it for development. While the idea does seem to make sense on the surface, a deeper look shows that there are significant costs and benefits to it.

Perhaps the greatest benefits to localisation lie in security and ease of access. RBI emphasised the latter by being the first government entity to call for localisation. The BN Justice Shrikrishna Committee and E-commerce policy have also called for localisation, citing similar grounds. However, there are significant costs to localising data in India and incurring those costs might not make data more secure. Firstly, building and maintaining data centres is a capital intensive business. It requires a significant amount of water, electricity, and bandwidth. Electricity and water are both commodities that India does not have in abundance. As of 2017, an estimated 240 million (24 crore) people in India did not have access to electricity. NITI Aayog estimates that 600 million (60 crore) people face a severe water shortage in India, and the situation will only get worse with the water demand being twice the supply by 2030. The recent Chennai water crisis does a lot to place emphasis on this. It would just not be fair or ethical to allocate water reserves to cool down data centres when they should be diverted to Chennai.

Secondly, as far as benefits are concerned, having data centres in India is not likely to make data more secure. India currently ranks 23rd in the global cybersecurity index. There have also been multiple leaks on the Aadhar data India does store locally. So there is a historical precedent for data stored on Indian servers to not be adequately protected. Moreover, if the idea is that storing data here is likely to impose an Indian jurisdiction on it, it may not pan out that way. The physical location of data does not define who owns it or has access to it. If Facebook decided to store data in India, the data would still belong to Facebook.

Given this, it is important to shift the data policy conversation from a storage location to access. Moreover, in doing so, it is important to adopt a strategic outlook. From this perspective, data is a tool of leverage, along with the size of the Indian market. India ranks at the 57th position in the Global Innovation Index. Our technology and innovation ecosystem has a lot of catching up to do, in comparison to those in the US and China. Therefore, allowing foreign competitors free and easy access to Indian data could stymie the growth of future Indian enterprises.

It would instead be far more prudent to pursue a policy of conditional access. There are a number of potential benefits to this approach.

Conditional access could either take the form of requirements for localisation along with investments and collaborations with Indian enterprises. A similar approach was recently taken by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways which shared vehicle and DL data with Indian companies for a fee of ₹3 Crore. The Vahan and Sarthi databases brought in a revenue of ₹65 crores in total and were made available to 87 domestic companies. Apart from expanding state revenues, such an approach with foreign firms could lead to greater capital investments in India along with the diffusion of technology and managerial and operational best practices. In the long run, this could aid India’s start-up and tech ecosystems.

However, going down this road requires clear domestic legislation and regulations. There are three broad areas regulation should be aimed at addressing. Firstly, defining domestic jurisdiction of data. There is a need to define laws on who owns data, the citizen or the state. Calling data national wealth sets a precedent in favour of state ownership of personal data. Once defined, procedures for judicial safeguards and parliamentary oversight should be put in place to determine who can access public data. That can be followed by discussions over the finer points on what kinds of data should be classified as sensitive and personal. The data protection bill addresses this to some extent. However, the bill is not law yet. Even if it were to become law, it is unclear what aspects of the bill will be changed.

Secondly, in case foreign players are to collaborate with the Indian ecosystem to use data, there needs to be a regulation providing for foreign access. This is likely to be a huge part of conditional localisation. Having a framework that facilitates domestic and foreign collaborations between companies as well as states could be helpful in leveraging data for Indian development. Thirdly, regulation needs to address standards in public data. If data collected by states is to be made accessible to private parties, there need to be national standards in how data is collected, sorted, and opened for access. This would help in processing data and deriving insights from it. Standards would also make it easier to maintain clean datasets.

Considering the above, making the argument for localisation might be a sound short-term negotiating strategy. But in order to strengthen one’s hand at the global table, in the long run, it’s important to focus on putting in place domestic rules and regulations and then negotiating conditional access.

The views expressed above are the authors' own. The article was first published in Deccan Herald.

The three elements of China’s innovation model

In November 2018, the New York Times published a series that began with a story titled, The Land that Failed to Fail. The central argument of the piece is that defying Western expectations, the Communist Party has maintained its control in China while adopting elements of capitalism, eschewing political liberalisation, and pursuing innovation. The last of these three — innovation — is the subject of this piece.What drives innovation in China? This is not merely a question about the mechanics of policy, the might of capital, the determination of dogged entrepreneurs, or the brilliance that is conjured up in university dormitories. Increasingly, it is a question that has acquired geopolitical significance, not just in the context of power politics but also in the debate over fundamental values about the political and economic organisation. In other words, the question that China’s march towards becoming a “country of innovators” raises is whether a political system that prioritises control can foster genuine innovation.Answering this requires an understanding of the key elements of the Chinese model of innovation. To my mind, there are three key components of this model—state support, a systems approach towards the development of new technologies and businesses, and building an effective “bird-cage.” There are, of course, other factors like the pursuit of prestige, the desire to rebalance the economy, the need to enhance the effectiveness of governance, and the size of the consumer market, which supports innovation. But it is the first three components that form the key pillars of China’s innovation model.Read More...

All Roads Lead to the Middle Kingdom

In January 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping stood at the podium in Davos defending economic globalisation. He argued that the world needed to “adapt to and guide economic globalisation, cushion its negative impact, and deliver its benefits to all countries and all nations.” And in this process, “China’s development is an opportunity for the world.” All of this was, of course, in the backdrop of the beginning of Donald Trump’s presidency in the US.Addressing deputies at the National People’s Congress in March 2018, Xi doubled down on that message: "China will contribute more Chinese wisdom, Chinese solutions, and Chinese strength to the world, to push for building an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity. Let the sunshine of a community with a shared future for humanity illuminate the world!"Both of those speeches reflected strength. The essential message they conveyed was that the world needed China. And under Xi, China now was surer about its destiny and keener than ever to play a larger international role. Yet as 2018 unfolded, this narrative came under severe strain. To assess how, we need to look at three dimensions: Xi’s status as the core of the Communist Party, the pushback against BRI, and the deepening competition with the US. It is the interplay of these three that is shaping China’s future.Read More...

China and the Kerch Strait

The UN Security Council held an emergency meeting on Monday to discuss escalating tensions between Russia and Ukraine following Sunday’s incident in the Kerch Strait. According to the Ukrainian Navy, Russian forces fired upon its vessels, injuring at least three sailors. Russian forces then reportedly captured three Ukrainian vessels along with 23 crew members. Moscow claims the vessels had entered Russian waters, failed to follow laid down protocols, and engaged in “provocative” actions.During Monday’s meeting in New York, Nikki Haley, the US’s UN representative, described the incident as a case of “reckless Russian escalation” and “aggression.” European Council President Donald Tusk has assured that the EU stands united behind Ukraine. In contrast, China’s deputy permanent representative to the UN Wu Haitao called for “restraint” and emphasised the Chinese approach of “objectivity and impartiality” in relation to Russia-Ukraine tensions. Wu further added that “China respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries including Ukraine.” Wu’s remarks underscore the delicate balance that Beijing is seeking to strike in terms of deepening its ties with Russia while distancing itself from Putin’s foreign policy adventurism. In this context, Sunday’s incident presents Beijing with a set of pitfalls and opportunities.Read More

The Xinjiang Playbook

To blunt criticism about its policies in the Xinjiang region, the Chinese Communist Party has adopted a set of measures ranging from denial to opinion management.

A cursory scan through Chinese State media talks about the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region as a place that’s becoming more secure, where tourism is booming, infrastructure is getting upgraded and poverty is reducing. That’s the Xinjiang that Beijing wants the world to talk about. Unfortunately for the Chinese leadership, that hasn’t been the case over the past few months.In mid-August, experts from the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination questioned the policies adopted by the Chinese Party-state with regard to the Uighur population in Xinjiang. Members of the committee argued that there had been credible reports that, “upwards of a million people were being held in so-called counter-extremism centres and another two million had been forced into so-called ‘re-education camps’ for political and cultural indoctrination.” All this, of course, is being done in the name of stability and combating extremism and terrorism.Situated in northwestern China bordering the stans to the west, Xinjiang is home to over 11.3 million ethnic Uighurs. These are largely Muslims of Turkic origin, who have their own language and culture. The region is also home to roughly one-third of China’s natural gas and oil reserves, along with key mineral deposits. In addition, Xinjiang is the Belt and Road Initiative’s gateway to the West. Given this, stability and integration i.e. policing and sinicisation, have been key planks of the Communist Party’s policies in Xinjiang. These assumed greater significance as the security situation in the region deteriorated early in President Xi Jinping’s first term and in the backdrop of the escalating conflict in Syria.Read more here>