The Implications of Mutual Assured Vulnerability for the Indo-Pacific Region

China’s nuclear modernisation might establish stability in the US-China nuclear dyad. However, it would have a cascading effect on the nuclear and conventional competition in the Indo-Pacific region

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has undertaken the qualitative and quantitative modernisation of its nuclear arsenal. In the past two years, China has constructed around 250-300 missile silos, tested a new hypersonic missile system, fielded at least two brigades of its road-mobile DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), handed over two Jin-class submarines to the People’s Liberation Army — one of which (Changzheng 18) was commissioned to enter service in April 2021, and continued deploying more road-mobile DF-31 AG launchers and dual-use DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).

चिनी हालचालींचा अंदाज

भारताच्या सीमेवर चीन जे करीत आहे, त्यामागे अनेक वर्षांचा विचार आणि पुढील अनेक दशकांचा वेध आहे. हा विचार केवळ भारतीय उपखंडाचा नाही, तर साऱ्या हिंद-प्रशांत क्षेत्राचा आहे. भारतालाही भविष्याचा वेध घेत पावले टाकायला हवीत...

भारतीय लष्कर आणि चीनची 'पीपल्स लिबरेशन आर्मी' यांच्यात अलीकडे प्रत्यक्ष ताबारेषेच्या चिनी बाजूकडील मोल्डो येथे कोअर कमांडर पातळीवर चर्चेची तेरावी फेरी पार पडली. पूर्व लडाखमधील हॉटस्प्रिंग्स येथील १५ क्रमांकाच्या गस्ती ठाण्यावरून दोन्ही बाजूंच्या फौजा मागे घेण्याचे उद्दिष्ट त्यात होते; परंतु या फेरीत कोंडी फुटली नाही. चीनच्या पश्चिम थिएटर कमांडच्या प्रवक्त्यांनी भारताकडून अवास्तव मागण्या होत असल्याचा आरोप केला. गेले १७ महिने दोन्ही लष्करे पूर्व लडाख सीमेवर अनेक ठिकाणी समोरासमोर उभी ठाकली आहेत. सप्टेंबर २०२०मध्ये प्रत्यक्ष ताबा रेषेवर ४५ वर्षांत प्रथमच गोळीबार झाला. पँगॉग सरोवराच्या दक्षिण तीराजवळ भारतीय लष्कराने भविष्यातील हालचालींचा वेध घेत काही मोहिमा केल्या. या पूर्वी अरुणाचल प्रदेशातील तुलुंग ला क्षेत्रात भारतीय गस्ती मोहिमेवर 'पीएलए'ने हल्ला चढविला; त्यावेळी भारत-चीन सीमेवरील गोळीबाराची घटना ऑक्टोबर १९७५मध्ये झाली होती. गेले १७ महिने चीन ज्या प्रकारे ठाण मांडून बसला आहे, त्याची व्याप्ती पाहिल्यास 'पीएलए'ने अशा झुंजीसाठी बरीच आधी तयारी केली असावी. सन २०२०च्या प्रारंभी तिबेटमध्ये सुरू झालेल्या मोठ्या लष्करी युद्धसरावातील सैनिक व प्रशिक्षणार्थी (कॉनस्क्रिप्ट्स-सैन्यातील अनिवार्य सेवेचे तरुण) यांच्या फौजा पूर्व लडाख सीमेकडे वळवण्यात आल्या. त्यातून हा झुंजीचा प्रसंग उभा राहिला. सीमेवर चीनने ज्या कारवाया सुरू केल्या, त्यांचा आवाका बघता भारतीय मुलकी व लष्करी गुप्तवार्ता यंत्रणांना धक्का बसला. या पूर्वी गेल्या दीड दशकात किमान तीन वेळा चीनने सीमा तंट्यावरून काही प्रदेश काबीज करण्याचा प्रयत्न केला होता. या घटना पुढील पेचप्रसंगाच्या निदर्शक होत्या. त्यातून भारतीय संरक्षण दले आणि सामरिक समुदायाला चीनचा पवित्रा बदलत असल्याची चाहूल लागायला हवी होती.

Read more on The Maharashtra Times website

China’s Border law: The Why, What & What Next

The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) passed a new law on October 23 for strengthening China’s border security management. The Land Border Law of PRC aims to improve coordination between the national, regional and local level authorities to maintain China’s national security and territorial integrity. It standardises how China patrols its massive 22,100 km land boundaries and borders with 14 countries. The law was first proposed in March 2021, approved at the closing meeting of the legislative session this Saturday and will go into effect by January 1, 2022.What is the law?With 62 clauses in seven chapters, the law underlines that “The PRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are sacred and inviolable and the state shall take measures to safeguard them.” It creates a legal framework for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and the border defence units to counter any invasion, encroachment, infiltration or provocation across its land borders.The article was originally published in the Times of India

Should India worry about China's military exercises in Tibet?

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army is undertaking more military exercises across all theatre commands, including Tibet,  to be prepared for real-time contingencies. It recently conducted two days and one night, combined armed forces, blue versus red army military exercises in Tibet last week. Its Tibet Military District (TMD) reportedly deployed more than ten combat units for these military exercises. These units were divided into two teams, the blue and red armies. The red army was the PLA, while the blue army most likely resembled India. This is not the first time such exercises were conducted by the PLA’s TMD, Western Theatre Command (WTC) or Xinjiang Military District’s (XMD) South Xinjiang Military Command – all three are directly or indirectly responsible for a contingency on the border with India.The article was originally published in the Times of India's TOI+ 

Why China is Building Missile Silos

Satellite pictures have revealed what appears to be an ongoing Chinese project to prepare vast new fields of missile silos that could possibly be used to launch nuclear weapons at China’s adversaries, including the United States and India. Why is China digging these silos?

Satellite images have revealed that China is building at least three missile silo fields in Yumen in Gansu province, near Hami in Xinjiang province, and at Hanggin Banner, Ordos City, in Inner Mongolia.

It appears that China is constructing around 120 missile silos at Yumen, around 110 silos in Hami, and 29 in the Hanggin Banner field. Earlier this year, 16 missile silos were detected in the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force’s (PLARF) Jilantai training area, also in Inner Mongolia.This was originally published in The Indian Express. Picture Credit: Planet Labs Inc. and the Indian Express.

PLA Turns 94 And More Threatening Than Ever

 India must be cautious of at least four changes that will impact the border dispute with China The Chinese People’s Liberation Army celebrated its 94th founding anniversary on August 1. Formed in 1927, it has become the world’s largest armed force but it’s no longer a conventional land-centric army. Under the Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping, it has undertaken military reforms intended to make it fully mechanised by 2020, informatised by 2035, and a world-class force by 2049.It has not yet achieved complete mechanisation, and Xi has also not defined what a world-class force means. But an informed guess is that it would mean being on a par with the US, UK, French, Russian and Indian armed forces.Although China’s primary strategic direction is reunification with Taiwan and to prepare for the US contingency during reunification, India and other Indo-Pacific countries are also impacted by its ongoing force modernisation. India needs to be cautious of at least four changes within PLA.Read more in the newspaper, the article was originally published in the Times of India.

The Galwan Valley One Year On: What's Changed with China and the PLA?

This month marks the first anniversary of the Galwan Valley clash between China and India, which resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian and at least four PLA soldiers. It also marks the first fatalities on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in over 45 years resulting from China’s attempts to change the status quo forcefully in Ladakh. The initial Chinese incursion was located at four points — Pangong Tso, the approach roads to the Depsang Plain, Gogra and Hotspring areas and Galwan Valley — which both China and India consider to be on their side of the LAC but were previously controlled by New Delhi. The Galwan Valley clash on the night of 15 June 2020 shattered three decades of trust and confidence established by five pacts signed between 1993 and 2012. In the days that followed, both sides deployed over two army divisions, battle tanks, self-propelled howitzers and surface to air missiles to Ladakh. Both sides also deployed fighter, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft and drones at forward bases near the border. In August 2020, India carried out a “pre-emptive” operation on Pangong Tso’s south bank to strengthen its on-ground position and create leverage while negotiating a Chinese withdrawal.

Today, after thirteen months of friction, eleven rounds of Corps Commander-level meetings, seven Work Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) meetings and at least two known interactions between India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the two sides have only disengaged at Galwan and Pangong Tso. The stand-off in Ladakh continues at other friction points. In his recent interview, India’s Chief of Army Staff, Gen MM. Naravane highlighted that India continues to maintain a significant troop presence along the entire border. Heightened tensions and a forward Sino-Indian military presence on the LAC seem to be the new status quo. But four specific developments on the Chinese side since the Galwan incident could further impact the LAC dispute in the future. Some are a direct result of the ongoing military stand-off, while others are a part of the broader PLA restructuring and China’s evolving military strategy.

This was originally published on 9Dashline, please read the whole article using the link.

How a new rail line in China will pose a security challenge to India

The Sichuan-Tibet rail link will help China mobilise the 77th Group Army and consolidate its hold on the border defence villages along the Sino-Indian border

China’s 14th Five-Year Plan, approved in the recent National People’s Congress’s (NPC) annual session, outlines the Sichuan-Tibet railway line near the China-India border as a key strategic priority.

The 1,629km Sichuan–Tibet high-elevation railway line will connect Chengdu, Sichuan province’s capital, to Lhasa, the capital of Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). The 14th Five-Year plan reportedly highlighted this railway’s central section, from Ya’an in Sichuan to Nyingchi in Tibet, as a key infrastructure project. In November 2020, the Communist Party of China’s general secretary and China’s president, Xi Jinping, said that this railway line’s work is extremely challenging due to the complex geological and climatic conditions and the region’s sensitive environment.

The article was originally published in the Hindustan Times. Cover Image Source: China Discovery

The problem with China’s new coastguard law

China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed a law on January 22, 2021, authorising its coastguards to open-fire on foreign vessels in the contested waters around its periphery. The law empowers its coastguards to use all necessary means to stop or prevent threats from foreign vessels and details the circumstances for using different weapons - hand-held, shipborne and airborne.

Read the full article in Deccan Herald

The People’s Liberation Army is strong. But it has four weaknesses

It hasn’t fought since 1979; it has been corrupt; it lacks skilled personnel; and it has financial issuesThe People’s Republic of China (PRC) will be celebrating the 93rd founding anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on August 1. Consolidated in 1927 during the Nanchang uprising by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), PLA was formed as an armed wing to counter the Kuomintang’s anti-communist purges during the Chinese civil wars. Since then, PLA has become the world’s largest armed force with around 2.03 million active and 510,000 reserve personnel.In its recent history, it had two important turning points. First, the United States (US)’ use of advanced and sophisticated weaponry in the first Gulf War of the 1990s compelled PLA to pursue technological advancement. Two, the Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman, Xi Jinping’s championing of the Chinese dream to make PLA a world-class force by 2049 led to its restructuring and rapid modernisation. However, despite the technological advances and growing military might, PLA has key weaknesses. Here are the four most important challenges for PLA at 93.The article was originally published in the Hindustan Times.

Is China's Western Theatre Command Confident Enough to Challenge India?

In 2013, during the Third Plenum of the18th Central Committee, it was announced by Xi Jinping that China would introduce widespread military reforms. This shift in policy came a year after Xi Jinping had succeeded Hu Jintao as General Secretary and at the beginning of his program of consolidating his faction’s hold over the Chinese Communist Party. Amid other reforms, including announcements on the economy, the Third Plenum specifically identified the People’s Liberation Army leadership, command and force structures, institutions, and civil-military integration as key areas for major reforms.

Xi initiated the reform process two years later in 2015 with the ambitious goal to make the PLA a fully mechanised force by 2020, informatised by 2035 with the key aim of turning it into a world-class army by 2050. These reforms included changes to the Central Military Commission’s bureaucratic structure, the creation of newer forces like the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) and the PLA Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF), and the formation of theatre commands for improving effectiveness between the various branches. Alongside these institutional reforms, Xi Jinping also prioritised weapons modernisation with the deployment of newer weapon systems.

The formation of the PLA’s Western Theatre Command (WTC) in 2016 saw the replacement of the old Chengdu and Lanzhou Military Regions and established a single unified command structure across Xinjiang, Tibet, and along the border of key states from Afghanistan and India. The impetus to modernise the PLA was accelerated after the 2017 Doklam stand-off which saw Indian and Chinese troops face-off in Bhutan. This along with amplified military training has helped the People’s Liberation Army to improve its firepower and develop its combat readiness, making it now more confident to challenge India along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Read more

Flashpoints on the Periphery: Understanding China’s Neighborhood Opportunism

How is China taking advantage of the pandemic to pursue its foreign policy goals?

Tensions in China’s periphery have increased dramatically over the past few months as Beijing stepped up the use of military and diplomatic tools within its neighborhood. The frequency of the events involving Chinese actors, especially in the second half of March, increased as normalcy started returning to the mainland after the COVID-19 pandemic’s outbreak.This raises a few questions. First, is this evidence of China’s opportunism at a time when the United States is struggling to maintain its presence in the East and Southeast Asian regions? Second, has Beijing adopted a more aggressive approach for the post-pandemic period? Third, would the recent spike in activities impact the regional order?Read more

This article was originally published in The Diplomat.

The PLA Insight: Issue no 52

I. The Takshashila Assessment: Impact of COVID-19 on the Chinese Armed ForcesThe People's Liberation Army played a prominent role in the Chinese leadership's effort to deal with the COVID-19 outbreak. Starting late January, China deployed thousands of PLA medics on the frontlines of Wuhan and Hubei province to help fight the outbreak. Besides the PLA, PAP and militia also aided in infrastructure building and provision of essential supplies. The PLA, in a press conference, claimed that there had been no cases of infection among the ranks of the deployed personnel.My colleague and the head of China Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution, Manoj Kewalramani, and I decided to examine this claim. We are happy to share our latest document on the impact of COVID-19 on the Chinese armed forces.We study four aspects:Read more...

Why WHO Must be Partly ‘Blamed’ For Coronavirus Global Pandemic

The World Health Organisation (WHO), founded to reduce health risks for all, is facing international criticism for its handling of the COVID-19 outbreak. WHO’s Director-General (DG), Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, has been accused of forwarding China’s interest rather than ensuring the containment of the virus through awareness procedures.WHO’s assessment, finally characterised COVID-19 as a pandemic on 11 March 2020, almost three months after its outbreak in Wuhan, China.

By then, there were already 118,332 confirmed cases globally with 4, 292 deaths. Coronavirus had already impacted people across 113 countries when the WHO declared it as a pandemic.

The article was originally published in The Quint.

Xinjiang in danger of severe Covid-19 outbreak

The World Health Organisation (WHO) declared the Covid-19 outbreak a pandemic this week. That designation implies an epidemic that has spread over several countries or continents, affecting a large number of people.The Chinese government initially tried to conceal the severity of the problem by hiding facts about the outbreak, which in turn contributed to the spread of the virus across the world. But the state machinery swung into action on January 23 by quarantining Wuhan and other cities in Hubei province, where the outbreak was first observed. Some cities on the east coast were also partially locked down as the number of cases increased.Though a lot of effort has gone into containing the spread of the virus across China, the situation in the westernmost Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, which is one of the most vulnerable regions for reasons detailed below, remains largely ignored and underreported.

The article was originally published in Asia Times

India’s Approach to the Indian Ocean Region: From Sea Control to Sea Denial

Given the budget constraints, the Indian Navy’s approach should change from sea control to sea denial

India’s Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat announced last month that India will prioritise submarines over its third aircraft carrier. The importance of this announcement was lost amid the clutter surrounding U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to India. “When we know that there would be two aircraft carriers there, and if the submarine force is dwindling, then our priority should be for submarines,” said General Rawat. It is a notable statement coming from the CDS himself, possibly hinting at the much-needed change of approach from sea control to sea denial towards the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).The article was originally published on The Diplomat.

Trump’s India visit tightens defense ties

Donald Trump concluded his 36-hour India tour on Tuesday evening. This was his first visit to India since being elected the 45th president of the United States in November 2016. His tour to India was much anticipated by both the countries, which have a common strategic objective of balancing China’s rise.This objective was reflected immediately in Trump’s first speech after landing in India, where he took a jab at China’s undemocratic rise. India’s rise “is all the more inspiring because you have done it as a democratic country, you have done it as a peaceful country, you have done it as a tolerant country, and you have done it as a great free country,” he said in his speech at Motera Stadium in Ahmedabad, Gujarat.The article was originally published in Asia Times.

PLA SSF: Why China will be ahead of everyone in future cyber, space or information warfare

People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force contingent made its debut appearance at China’s military day parade, earlier this year. Formed on this day in 2015, it is mandated to create synergies between China’s space, cyber and electronic warfare. The PLA considers these three domains critical for “commanding strategic heights.” The SSF was formed to optimise China’s dominance in these three domains and also contribute to enhancing the PLA’s broader goals of strategic deterrence and integration for information warfare. Read more...

4 Lessons for India From China’s October 2019 Military Parade

With the People’s Republic of China (PRC) marking its 70th founding anniversary on October 1, the grand military parade at Tiananmen Square was the highlight of the celebrations. It showcased China’s newer arms, ammunition, and technology. Over 15,000 personnel, 160 aircraft, and 580 pieces of military equipment participated in the military parade, including sophisticated weaponry such as hypersonic missiles, intercontinental-range land and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, stealth combat and high-speed reconnaissance drones, and fifth-generation fighter jets.China intended to address both domestic and international audiences through this parade. At home, the leadership hoped that the parade would stir up feelings of nationalism. Internationally, the display of force was intended as a warning to the United States and China’s neighbors. Further, the parade reflected the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) progress toward becoming a “world-class military” by 2050.Although policymakers and military leaders across the world were keeping a close eye on China’s military display, perhaps those in India should have been paying the most attention. The parade was not directed at India, but New Delhi can learn a lot from China’s use of military modernization and its ongoing defense reforms. Here are four key lessons New Delhi can take from China’s 2019 military parade. Read more...

Should India be bolder with China?

India’s response to China’s diplomatic offensive of recent years has been inconsistent and sporadic. Using diplomatic tools in an institutionalised way to highlight China’s vulnerabilities is something India refrains from. This, despite China’s increased diplomatic activism against India. For instance, China raised the dilution of Article 370 in the United Nations Security Council on behalf of Pakistan. It has repeatedly blocked India’s entry into the 48-member Nuclear Supplier Group. It also took over 10 years to sponsor the blacklisting of Masood Azhar as a UN-designated global terrorist.India should not refrain from developing diplomatic leverages and using them against China, whenever required. It should issue statements on China’s “re-education camps” in Xinjiang, its activities in the South China Sea which impact India, and Hong Kong protests. It could also occasionally use Tibet as an irritant like China uses Kashmir. All of these with the presumption that India has improved its border infrastructure to at least maintain status quo in case of escalation of tensions. Read more...