Commentary
Find our newspaper columns, blogs, and other commentary pieces in this section. Our research focuses on Advanced Biology, High-Tech Geopolitics, Strategic Studies, Indo-Pacific Studies & Economic Policy
Chinese Communist Party has goals. India needs to have its own, not just respond to aggression
This article was originally published in ThePrintThere are glaring dissimilarities in India’s foreign policy stances towards China post the military disengagement in Doklam 2017 and the ongoing one in Ladakh. The former was followed by a reset that resembled closeness and acquiescence through informal summits in Wuhan and Mamallapuram while the latter seems to have prompted a distancing from China that was exemplified in the elevation of the Quad meeting to the level of political leadership on 12 March 2021 wherein Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that “members of the Quad will be closer than ever before”. Remarkably, for the first time, a joint statement was issued which was followed up by a joint article by the Quad leaders was also published in The Washington Post and China’s reaction is awaited. Meanwhile, it was not surprising that China was stalling the disengagement process in Ladakh.
While one can endlessly speculate on China’s motives in Doklam and Ladakh, what matters ultimately is the strategic effect of Chinese military aggression on India. Loss of trust cannot be cranked up impetuously. In any case, the Wuhan and Mamallapuram facade has perished and the reality of China’s perennial perfidy should forewarn and prepare us to exercise greater circumspection and watchfulness.
Why China is the Kautilya of international politics
This article was first published in ThePrintThe gameplay on the chessboard of global politics continues to cast its shadow on India’s relationships with the United States, China, nations of the sub-continent, and within its own federal units. For the skeptics of Kautilya’s continued relevance, the contemporary geopolitical chessboard underlines the chief tenets of Kautilyan rajamandala, or ‘circle of states’ – a concentric, geopolitical conception of the inter-state realm typifying friend-foe relationships.
Ironically, if there is one country that eminently exemplifies the Kautilyan template in international conduct, it is China – who was till the Ladakh episode, the quintessential madhyama (middle king) of the inter-state realm. A middle king is defined as “one with territory immediately proximate to those of the Ari (enemy) and the conqueror (hypothetically Pakistan and India respectively), capable of helping them when they are united or disunited and of suppressing them when they are disunited.” True to this definition, China had skilfully calibrated its dynamics with Pakistan and India. It had entered into a negotiated agreement (samdhi) with India (roughly co-equal then) through the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement of 1993 and several other agreements of 1996, 2003 and 2012, at a time when a stable neighbourhood was vital for its economic growth.
The problem with China’s new coastguard law
Unless China changes thinking, any border agreement is a perishable good
It should not come as a surprise that the Narendra Modi government and some in the media and strategic community have projected the military agreement to disengage on both banks of the Pangong Tso in Ladakh as a triumph. The footage of Chinese forces dismantling their forward stations and retreating behind the agreed positions supports this contention.
It should also not come as a surprise that the Opposition has criticised the agreement as a defeat, with Congress’ Rahul Gandhi accusing the prime minister of “ceding” territory to the Chinese. The fact that Indian troops can no longer patrol the areas between Fingers 4 and 8 — that the Chinese previously recognised as outside their claim, and that the Indian Army used to regularly patrol before the 2020 standoff — lends credence to this criticism.
In its centenary year, the CCP’s revisionist history
In July, the Communist Party of China (CCP) will celebrate its centenary. This is the most important event in the CCP’s political calendar. It presents an opportunity for the leadership to highlight developmental achievements, which are seen as critical to its legitimacy. Economic development, however, is one of many factors that feed the algorithm of legitimacy. Viewing the question of legitimacy simply from a transactional prism of the party ensuring developmental outcomes in exchange for obedience is reductive, resulting in a misunderstanding of what sustains CCP rule in China. History, or more precisely, building and guiding a supportive historical narrative is crucial too.Read the full article in Hindustan Times here.
Responding to Southeast Asian concerns will raise our influence
An annual survey of Southeast Asia’s policy elite throws up three striking findings. First, despite being both the most influential power in Southeast Asia and providing the most help to ASEAN countries during the covid pandemic, China is increasingly distrusted in the region. Second, despite its insignificant political, strategic and economic influence in the region and posing little threat to any country, most respondents do not have confidence that India will “do the right thing" to contribute to peace, security, prosperity and governance. Third, a mere change of guard in Washington has turned around the region’s view of the United States, which is now looked towards with greater confidence and positivity.Read the full article on The Mint
India shouldn’t worry, Myanmar needs us more to prevent China domination
International reactions to military coups fall into two broad categories — “we demand the immediate restoration of democracy” or “the generals might be bastards, but they are our bastards”. The two responses appear mutually exclusive, but to astute practitioners of statecraft, they are not. One way to accomplish this is to say one thing and do the other. A more sophisticated way is to say and do both things simultaneously. If we were to employ such methods in our personal and domestic lives, it would be rightly considered duplicitous, hypocritical, and immoral. In the amoral world of international relations, however, the same value judgements don’t readily apply. What matters is how well you secure your national interest.Read the full article on ThePrint
The race to map the ocean deep
India is falling behind efforts to map the undersea environment of the Indo-Pacific regionMajor powers are investing time and money deploying UUVs in these waters because of the valuable oceanographic and hydrographic data they provide. Oceanography is the study of the physical and biological aspects of the oceans. Hydrography is the process by which the ocean bed is surveyed and navigation aids and charts are produced, providing ships the maritime equivalent of roadmaps and road signs.Oceanography and hydrography have clear civilian applications: scientific research into climate and marine ecology, surveying the ocean floors to ensure safer navigation of merchant vessels, and collecting information for oil and gas or other seabed mining activities.However, there are also equally clear naval applications: Hydrographic data ease the movement of naval surface ships. More important, they provide crucial information for submarines and for those tasked with hunting them. Over the coming years, the study of the oceans and the seabed is likely to become a source of power and influence in the Indo-Pacific region.Read the full article on Asia Times
Jack Ma story: China’s deep strategic ambition
Earlier this month, the Chinese tech tycoon, Jack Ma, made his first public appearance ever since the suspension of Ant Group’s $37 billion IPO in November. Ant is an affiliate company of Alibaba, the e-commerce giant that he co-founded. The crackdown on Ant followed Jack Ma’s comments in late October during a public event in Shanghai. He had then criticised Chinese regulators for harbouring a “pawnshop mentality,” focusing on pledges and collaterals when it came to finance.
Weaning away foreign investment from China
Over the past few years, there has been much discussion about India attracting firms that might be seeking to exit China. Initially, these conversations were driven by changes in the Chinese economy, such as rising labour costs, shifting focus towards new technologies and declining productivity. There was a sense that these changes, coupled with improving infrastructure and ease of doing business in India, would make India an attractive option.
America’s strategic rivalry with China won’t change under Biden
The United States’ Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific, an extant policy document declassified and published last week by the outgoing Donald Trump administration, is mostly music to New Delhi’s ears. Assuming that “a strong India, in cooperation with like-minded countries, would act as a counterbalance [to] China", one of Washington’s objectives is to “accelerate India’s rise and capacity to serve as a net provider of security and Major Defense Partner" and “solidify an enduring strategic partnership with India underpinned by a strong Indian military able to effectively collaborate with the United States and our partners in the region to address shared interests." Becoming India’s preferred partner on security issues is one of the desired ends of the United States’ policy. Much of this has already been stated by US officials over the past two decades. But mere talk is cheap. The cold hard print of an apex policy document ought to make Washington’s intentions a lot more credible in New Delhi.Read the full article on The Mint
India, China and the Proverbial 13-year gap that is widening
Decoding the DC-Brussels-Beijing geopolitical triangle
Joe Biden’s election as the United States (US) president has led to talk of greater coordination between Washington and Brussels over China. In early November, European Union (EU) foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell was quick to call for “a coherent and robust China stance” between the transatlantic allies. Biden, meanwhile, has promised to consult traditional allies to “develop a coherent strategy” on China.Read the full article in Hindustan Times.
China’s Economy May Be ‘Slowing Down’, But Don’t Write Off BRI Yet
Ever since it was launched, there’s been a raging debate about the sustainability of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Conventionally, these conversations take shape depending on where you stand. In other words, depending on one’s ideological and geopolitical prism, BRI is either a grand strategic plan that is reshaping the global political and economic order or an example of Xi Jinping’s hubris, which is leading to overreach, and will eventually collapse under the weight of its own contradictions. A new Financial Times report this week, highlighting a sharp decline in Chinese overseas lending, sparked another such debate.Read the full article in The Quint.
China wants a reset with Biden, but won’t change its approach
There has been much debate about why China was slow to acknowledge Joe Biden’s election victory. It took nearly a week after Biden’s victory speech for China’s foreign ministry to issue formal congratulations. Xi Jinping is among the few world leaders who still hasn’t spoken to Biden. Despite that, Beijing has been watching the unfolding political drama in the United States (US) with a sense of cautious optimism.Read the full article in the Hindustan Times.
China’s Semiconductor Gold Rush: A Reality Check
By Pranay Kotasthane and Rohan Seth
The semiconductor industry has become a major front in the US-China tech war. Given that this is a weak link in China’s otherwise impressive technology stack, the US has imposed export controls restricting Chinese semiconductor companies from accessing key equipment, software, and intellectual property.This article was first published in the South China Morning Post. Views are personal. Read more here.
A coalition to counter China will take some time to operationalise
This story was first published in The Mint. Views are personal.This week, another important cog in the machinery of strategic cooperation between India and the United States fell into place when the two countries signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (Beca) for Geospatial Intelligence. The agreement opens the doors for India to get access to military-grade global positioning system signals, digital imagery and mapping that can upgrade the capabilities of our defence forces and intelligence agencies. For the United States, the agreement not only helps lock India in as a defence equipment buyer, but more importantly, is one more step towards drawing New Delhi onto its side, geopolitically.Read More
The Bangladesh comparison
India was a midwife in the birth of Bangladesh. She sent in her army to liberate the newly born independent nation and even stood up to threats from the world’s mightiest power, the United States, which had sent its Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal. Henry Kissinger, the US secretary of state, contemptuously referred to an infant Bangladesh as a “basket case”, meaning it would be hopelessly mired in poverty, hunger, and disease. India welcomed and gave refuge to almost ten million refugees from the newly forming nation, as they fled military atrocity, hunger, and deprivation.Bangladesh from the very beginning was counted among the least developed nations as per the United Nations and enjoyed the generosity of foreign aid in its development. It also had other concessions like the generalised system of preferences (GSP), which meant that its exports had duty-free access to western nations. India lost its GSP status recently. Bangladesh got interest-free long-term loans from development banks like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank.Read More
China’s new data security initiative has implications for India
This article was first published in Deccan Chronicle. Views are personal.Recently, the Chinese government announced the launch of a new Data Security Initiative. Outlining its components, Foreign Minister Wang Yi said he hoped that China can provide a “blueprint” for the formulation of international rules for digital security.The Chinese initiative entails eight broad principles, which include a call for supply chain stability, pledges against data theft and surveillance, norms for data storage and access, and a requirement for technology companies to not abuse their market dominance.
Wang’s announcement came a month after the United States launched its new Clean Network program in early August.The US initiative explicitly seeks to exclude Chinese telecommunications firms, apps, cloud service providers, and undersea cables from internet infrastructure used by the US and partner countries. The initiative draws upon a range of different standards, such as the Prague Proposals and the European Union’s 5G Toolbox.
Heed Napoleon’s words as China fancies its odds of taking Taiwan
The ongoing confrontation between Indian and Chinese troops along the Himalayan frontiers is serious, but pales in comparison with the situation across the Taiwan Strait. Over the weekend of 18-19 September, China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and Navy (PLAN) flew 37 aircraft—including fighters and bombers—across the centre line that has served as the informal boundary between the mainland and Taiwan. One of the intruding pilots declared to Taiwanese defenders on the radio that “there is no median line in the Taiwan Strait." Beijing’s intrusions coincided with and were certainly a reaction to a US state department official’s visit to Taipei. As an intimidatory tactic, China’s move is highly risky. One miscalculation by a pilot or an air defence operator could spark a conflict that could well draw in the United States and its allies into a bigger war.Read more