Commentary
Find our newspaper columns, blogs, and other commentary pieces in this section. Our research focuses on Advanced Biology, High-Tech Geopolitics, Strategic Studies, Indo-Pacific Studies & Economic Policy
High time Indian Foreign Policy jettisons ‘don’t annoy China’ notion & Supports Virus Probe
Of late, Covid-19 has been getting a geopolitical boost from the tailwinds of political and scientific narratives originating primarily from the US. In May, US President Joe Biden ordered an intelligence probe into the origins of the novel coronavirus or SARS-CoV-2. The fact that it originated in China is undisputed. Scientific suspicions that the virus is an artificial creation and probably leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology have now received a booster dose. Anthony Fauci, the Chief Medical Adviser to the US President, stated that he never played down the possibility of the lab leak in China for political reasons. In the last few weeks, a slew of scientific papers have reinforced the lab leak theory, with the G7 and the European Union adding political traction to the call for concerted action to uncover the truth. International politics has now inserted itself into the investigative process and is gaining momentum within the spaces of scientific doubts regarding the origin of the virus. In the long run, the scientific quest for facts draped in political free play could eventually be the information missile that could do a lot of damage to China.In the case of Covid-19, science, geography and politics could create a potent brew in the information age. In global geopolitics, this could become deadly for China. For China’s detractors, it might provide informational fuel and create the psychological effect that can, at the global level, drive popular anger directed against the country. It is an anger that has the potential to sustain because of the colossal damage caused by Covid to lives and livelihood.Read the full article in ThePrint
Five Trends in India-China Ties a Year after the Galwan Valley clash
The June 2020 clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers in the Galwan Valley has frequently been termed as a watershed moment in the history of bilateral relations. The incident marked the first loss of life in conflict along the boundary between the two countries in over four decades. A year later, while some equations have shifted, there has not been a sudden break — rather, ties appear to be drifting towards greater contestation with a certain ambivalence evident on both sides. This is underscored by five key trends.Read the full article in the Quint here.
The banal geopolitical fallout of the laboratory leak hypothesis
On 11 September 2001, the US suffered four coordinated terrorist attacks that claimed nearly 3,000 lives, injured over 25,000 people and caused at least $10 billion in property damage. Within hours, the US National Security Agency had intercepted phone calls that led them to suspect Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda of having planned and carried out the attacks. On that same evening, the CIA director confirmed this assessment to the US president. In two weeks, the FBI identified the specific attackers, and by the end of the month had published photographs and nationalities of all 19 terrorists who carried out the attacks. Of them were 15 Saudis, two Emiratis, a Lebanese and an Egyptian. Bin Laden himself was a Saudi national and Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, a key conspirator, was Pakistani. The US authorities knew Bin Laden and his outfit quite well, for they had together fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, along with the Saudi and Pakistani intelligence agencies. So it is fair to say that one would have to have one’s head firmly buried in the sand to miss the glaring Saudi and Pakistani links to—and possible complicity in—the attacks.Read the full article in The Mint
US shifting its Tibet stance. When will India end its silence?
The Dalai Lama’s succession may be stirring the pot of Buddhism at the global geopolitical table. China’s sensitivity to Tibetan issues has long been viewed by some nations as having a high potential for leverage in the conduct of relations with it. But Donald Trump shook up the Tibetan pot in December 2020 when he signed into law the Tibetan Policy and Support Act 2020 or TPSA and changed the contours of the earlier US policy, which under the Barack Obama administration had sacrificed the region’s interests in order to foster better US-China relations.
The TPSA declares that the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan Buddhist leaders are religious matters and all decisions pertaining to reincarnations rest solely with the Tibetan Buddhist faith community based on the instructions of the 14th Dalai Lama and without interference by the government of the People’s Republic of China. The law also acknowledges the Central Tibetan Administration (the Government in Exile in Dharamshala) that is committed to peacefully negotiating its status as an autonomous entity within China. Last month, the Biden administration opted to continue the Trump policy.Read the full article in ThePrint
India’s gamble on China failed in Ladakh. But there’s a new risk worth taking
The deadlock on military de-escalation in Ladakh continues. It might turn out to be another example of China’s perfidy. India has had sufficient historical experience with China’s use of agreements for buying time and deceiving us. The 2018 agreement for defusing the crisis in Doklam and its subsequent military occupation of the rest of the Doklam plateau is fresh in memory. It should have warned us about the dangers of China getting India to withdraw from a tactically advantageous position at the Kailash Range in Ladakh and then using delay tactics to keep India under pressure.
China’s strategic behaviour can only be interpreted if one views the military moves in Ladakh in the broader perspective of China-US geopolitical rivalry. China’s ambitions that generate its geopolitical compulsions are no longer being concealed. Xi Jinping is claiming that the US and China are now virtually equal powers and it is only a matter of time before China surpasses America economically and, if some Chinese claims are to be believed, even technologically. At the same time, China believes India can be an impediment to its ambitions. But only if India’s partnership with the US exploits a geographic reality steeped in the maritime domain and threatens China’s dreams of predominance at the global and regional geopolitical table.Read the full article in ThePrint
In India’s Covid-19 challenge, China’s hopes and anxieties
The second wave of Covid-19 in India has been among the biggest international stories being covered across the Chinese media. The coverage reflects a sense of anxiety and opportunity.In terms of the former, there is concern about the spread of the so-called double mutant, or B.1.617 strain of the virus across the region and into China. A fresh wave of domestic outbreaks would be deeply damaging for the Communist Party, which declared victory against the virus last year, and would take a toll on China’s economic recovery. Likewise, a massive public health crisis across the Indian subcontinent, at the minimum, would hurt Chinese commercial interests and investments. At worst, it could result in a humanitarian catastrophe with the potential to stoke socio-political instability along China’s periphery.At the same time, the situation in India presents opportunities for Beijing. At the bare minimum, there is a commercial opportunity, given the shortage of emergency supplies, equipment and therapeutics. But, at a deeper level, there are geopolitical opportunities. This is reflected in the Chinese media’s critical coverage of the delayed response by the Joe Biden administration, the emphasis on China’s manufacturing prowess and its centrality to key supply chains, and foreign minister Wang Yi’s summit with his South Asian counterparts, which focused on health supplies and vaccines.
How China’s Nuclear Ambiguity Affects India
What China’s nuclear ambiguity means for India is different from that for other nuclear powers such as the United States and Russia.
Ever since China exploded its first nuclear device in 1964, Beijing’s nuclear strategy has largely remained unchanged: it is based on achieving deterrence through assured retaliation. A crucial requirement for this is the survivability of its arsenal following a nuclear or conventional adversary’s first strike. But the improved technology and evolving security dynamics with the United States have compelled China to rethink its operational capabilities to achieve effective deterrence. China is rapidly attempting to modernize its conventional and nuclear arsenal and increase its nuclear ambiguity through subtle changes in the doctrine, force posture, and capabilities.
UK outlines global-focused defense strategy
Britain seeks to remain relevant in a world where it sees threats proliferating, while its finances are shrinking
The United Kingdom has outlined a vision for its defense and foreign-engagement priorities in its latest Integrated Review and Defense Command Paper.The paradigm of defense reviews in the UK goes back at least to the 1950s. The new document, published in March, has implications ranging from raising and appropriating defense spending to setting up new international bureaucratic structures and strategic nuclear signaling that nobody expected.It is no exaggeration to say that the document is Britain’s plan to remain relevant in a world where it sees threats proliferating, while its finances are shrinking.
Cummings couldn’t ‘cut’ it
Boris Johnson, the current British prime minister, promised an integrated review during his election campaign in 2019. However, at the time, Dominic Cummings, the technocratic chief adviser to the PM, was thought to be influencing the review. Until his exit from Downing Street in November last year, there was a lot of speculation on the review bringing a lot of cuts.Cummings was thought to prefer investment in high-tech solutions and wouldn’t shrink from cutting personnel and conventional security and war-fighting capabilities in the belief that they’d be obsolete in the very near future.
But in the end, in the final document, the cuts are not as severe as initially thought, though the focus on high-tech solutions and new war-fighting domains like cyber, artificial intelligence, space and information technology remain.In several places throughout the document, Russia has been identified as a major “active threat” to the UK and China as a “systemic competitor,” which broadly conforms to the general alignment and policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).In response, the Russian ambassador to the UK, Andrei Kelin, has said that the “political relationship between Moscow and London is nearly dead” – under the circumstances, not an unfair observation.Read the full article on Asia Times
In West Asia, where US and China’s interests intersect
Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s recent six-nation tour of West Asia has sparked discussions about Beijing’s taking a more active approach in the region. In part, this is driven by China’s expanding interests; in part, it is a product of the China-United States (US) competition and geopolitical churn underway after Joe Biden’s election.Read the full article in the Hindustan Times.
Seventh Fleet move a reminder that Quad must remain a group of equals, not a US-led posse
The US Navy’s Seventh Fleet statement of 7 April 2021, after the freedom of navigation operation off Maldives in India’s Exclusive Economic Zone or the EEZ, even if legally valid, and watered down later by the Pentagon Spokesman, was unwarranted and seems indifferent to the sensitive phase in India-US relations. Post the statement, it is understood that China’s defence attaché in New Delhi went to town pointing out the US’ treatment of India as a rebuke of a subordinate. The possibility of this poke in India’s strategic eye being a lower level gaffe cannot be ruled out. But if it was earlier sanctioned by the US Secretary of Defence, then one can surmise that it was meant to convey who is the boss. That would be unfortunate for India-US relations because a reluctant New Delhi has now finally shed its inhibitions with regards to the Quad. The US seems to have misunderstood India’s political stance, especially New Delhi’s understanding of the nature of Quad.
In India’s view, the resurrected Quad is a platform that has four partners at its core with others being invited to participate, depending on common interests. Therefore, the specific issues that relate to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, Vietnam, Philippines or any effected country, could be potentially co-opted. Such flexibility can be a fruitful method for the Quad to adopt.
What's behind China's Wolf Warrior Diplomacy?
China’s imposition of punitive sanctions on EU institutions and individuals over Xinjiang, its attacks on the West’s colonial past when discussing human rights and the recent outburst by Yang Jiechi during the dialogue in Anchorage have all re-ignited discussions over Beijing’s assertive diplomacy. In fact, throughout the past year, there has been much debate about the increasing abrasiveness of Chinese diplomats.
Russia-Japan relations and why the Kurils matter
While there are signs of pragmatism in both Moscow and Tokyo, this last barrier to concluding WW2 remains
The Kuril Islands, or the Northern Territories as Japan likes to call them, are at the center of an uneasy relationship between Russia and Japan.The USSR occupied the islands between August and September 1945. Since the end of World War II, the disputed territory and related issues are the primary subject of engagement between the two countries.The contention over the ownership of the Kurils is also the main hurdle for the conclusion of World War II between the two nations. Over the decades, the diplomatic efforts by Japan have been unsuccessful in getting the islands back.In recent times there has been considerable cause to suggest that the Russian side has taken or has been compelled to take an icy approach to settling the Kuril Islands dispute because of public opinion.Laws in the new constitution adopted by Russia in July 2020 criminalize any alienation of Russian territories or advocacy for territorial concessions. These laws apply equally to every part of Russia, including those with some controversy around them, such as the Kuril Islands, Crimea and Kaliningrad.Read the full article on Asia Times
India’s recognition of Taliban should just be tactical, not let it rule Afghanistan again
This article was first published in ThePrint.Afghanistan is living proof that technological superiority in warfare is an insufficient condition for winning wars. The political outcomes of wars are hostage to success on the political table of diplomatic parleys. How else can one explain that the most powerful nation in the world, equipped with state-of-the-art technology and after having expended a great deal of blood and costly resources, has been unable to achieve favourable political outcomes. Yes, the US has so far prevented the Taliban from coming back to power in Kabul. But even that accomplishment was, for all practical purposes, undermined when the Donald Trump administration negotiated a peace deal with the Taliban in February 2020 and conceded that the militants can share power with the Afghan government as long as Afghanistan is not utilised as a base to launch terrorist attacks against the US. A peace deal that was done without the concurrence of the democratically elected government of Ashraf Ghani. Dumping allies has never troubled the US too much.
The peace process had envisaged the withdrawal of all American troops by 1 May 2021. But with Joe Biden as president now, the deal seems to be in jeopardy, because the US has serious concerns of a Taliban takeover once the withdrawal takes place without a power-sharing agreement between the Ashraf Ghani government and the Taliban. The US is pressuring the Ghani government for an agreement and is, in all probability, pushing Pakistan to get the Taliban to make concessions including the continued presence of US troops. Pakistan’s supposed change of stance was publicly projected through a tweet on what the DG ISPR said on 25 February: “Today’s Afghanistan is not the country it was in the nineties, whose state structure collapsed easily. Pakistan has also changed. It is not possible for [the] Taliban to take over Kabul and for Pakistan to support them. That will never happen.”
Meanwhile, the US leverage with Pakistan has strengthened somewhat due to the latter’s dire economic status and weakened support from its traditional Arab friends.
The Intra-Afghan negotiations are expected to discuss the ceasefire; agreement over the future political roadmap of Afghanistan; the rights of women, free speech, and changes to the country’s constitution. The talks would also have to chalk out the fate of Taliban fighters as well as all the armed militias. This is a tall order to meet before the 1 May deadline.
Missing the wood for the trees
The Biden administration is backing several meetings between high-level Afghan government and Taliban officials. One such was hosted in Moscow in mid-March, which was also attended by US Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, and representatives of Iran, India, China and Pakistan. The next one is to follow in Turkey in April. Afghanistan was the focus at the Heart of Asia Conference held in Tajikistan on 30 March and India was represented by foreign minister S. Jaishankar who stated: “India has been supportive of all the efforts being made to accelerate the dialogue between the Afghan government and the Taliban, including intra-Afghan negotiations”. He also declared India’s support for a regional process to be convened under the aegis of the United Nations.The conventional wisdom in India has always been that withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan will be detrimental to New Delhi’s interests as the Taliban could come to power and that would halt India’s aspirations to access Central Asia through the Chabahar Port. Also, a Taliban in power may provide the impetus of breeding terrorists that Pakistan would channelise towards India. These concerns are valid. But this view may be missing the wood for the trees.The real battle involving force in Afghanistan has been between a US-backed Afghan government and the Pakistan-backed Taliban. The US is no longer willing to pay the price for its continued backing of the government. It is desperate for an honourable exit. There is now an increased likelihood that the US will first try with the help of Pakistan to get the Taliban to agree to an extension of the withdrawal date. Broadly, three scenarios could now unfold.
Three options for Afghanistan
Scenario One. The Intra-Afghan talks fail, and the Taliban starts an offensive and takes control of key road communication links weakening the Afghan government’s ability to govern its provinces. The US stays put and further Intra-Afghan talks are stalled. Violence spikes and the civil war deepens endlessly.
Scenario Two. The Intra-Afghan talks fail. The US exits. Taliban launches a major offensive with Pakistan support and Kabul falls. Pakistan recognises the Taliban government. Former Afghan forces consolidate in northern Afghanistan bordering Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Some forces are given shelter in Iran. Taliban establishes an ideologically extremist State.
Scenario Three. Intra-Afghan talks succeed. The Taliban shares power. The US exits. A fragile peace prevails for a year or two but is followed by a civil war with Pakistan backing the Taliban. The global community’s attention to violence receives a resigned acknowledgement. Russia, Iran, China and India take sides and provide support in various forms. Pakistan evades US pressure and that pushes it deeper into China’s embrace.
US must leave, Afghans must decide
None of these scenarios has a happy ending. However, the complex web of actors in Afghanistan tends to distract attention from the primary issue that must be resolved even if it has to be done through the currency of violence. It is about the rejection or acceptance by the Afghan people of the Taliban as an extremist religious entity. Decades of foreign interference has only prolonged the long and tortuous journey to peace. Afghans themselves must be left to resolve this ideological war. The US must exit with or without progress on Intra-Afghan talks and most importantly, all international actors, preferably through the UN Security Council, must mutually agree to non-interference and only provide humanitarian aid and developmental assistance. Pakistan’s public change of posture enunciated by its DG ISPR is encouraging, but it will require both the US and China to help Islamabad keep its word.India’s recent tacit recognition of the Taliban should at best be a tactical move. Strategically, the Taliban in power in Afghanistan is detrimental to India’s interest. India must not waver from its stand on the ideological front even as it leaves it to the Afghans to resolve the resultant imbroglio. The exit of the US will deny the Taliban the narrative of pushing its ideology in the garb of fighting the foreigners and will be a strategic blow for them. For India, Pakistan will lose leverage with the US and that can only be to our benefit. A US exit can only do good. Prolonging its stay also deepens the misery of the Afghan people without an end in sight.Lt Gen Prakash Menon is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution, Bangalore and former Military Adviser, National Security Council Secretariat. Views are personal.
How a new rail line in China will pose a security challenge to India
The article was originally published in the Hindustan Times. Cover Image Source: China Discovery
Ladakh didn’t work out for China. It will now drive a wedge between Quad partners
This article originally appeared in ThePrint. You can read it here.In the contemporary global geopolitical landscape, China has evoked more fear than hope. It has displayed an impressive capacity for political organisation to pursue its objectives. After nearly three decades of resting hopes on a China that will be a responsible power in the international system, there is now an increased consensus among most Western and Asian powers that a collective approach is necessary to tackle it.
China’s justification for its strategic behaviour rests on a historical argument of recapturing its rightful place in the world that was earlier displaced by Western imperialism. This is a historically revisionist argument that is factually correct but would also be the case for many nations of the world. This argument was earlier used for incorporating Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia. As China has grown progressively stronger, it has been embarking on its other questionable historical territorial claims that particularly involve India, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia. China has also created artificial islands in the South China Sea on at least seven reefs and islets and built military infrastructure on them, which includes three airfields.
China’s economic heft as the manufacturing hub of the world, coupled with its Belt and Road Initiative, has been mobilised to create a web of dependencies and influence. Thus, several nations are vulnerable to exploitation and eventual subordination. The success of this project entails progress towards a historically imagined Middle Kingdom. Combined with its growing military power, China is on a neo-colonial path and on the lookout for converting more and more nations into vassal states. Asian powers are facing the brunt of it and one of the major areas in contention is understandably the geographical space that is the lifeblood of China’s economic power – the Indo-Pacific.
The Quad pushback
The recent version of Quad, or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, as a cooperative strategic visualisation, has an expanded concept of security to include several other areas. It signifies the pushback to China’s rise and the consequent aggressive behaviour. The Quad finally came to acquire political ballast in February 2021 after more than a decade in limbo. For long, both India and Australia were uncomfortable being viewed as part of any cooperative venture ostensibly aimed at China. But the concurrent turn of events in both the countries has combined with the change of administration in the US to conclude that the time for Quad had arrived. India’s hesitancy was cast aside by China’s Ladakh aggression. Australia faced the brunt of China’s economic antipathy.China is certain, now, to attempt to rearrange its pieces on the global geopolitical chessboard. Xi Jinping ought to avoid major risky ventures in an ambience where the winds of anti-China sentiments are gathering steam and greater possibilities exists of the US catalysing opposition against it. This could herald the deepening of China’s strategic nightmare regarding a combined opposition to its rise, coming home to roost. China has already foreseen this possibility and pulled Russia into its fold, a realignment that was hastened by the worsening of US-Russia relations. The support for the Quad from other European powers like France, UK, Germany and some Asean nations like Vietnam should also give pause to China. However, China will continue to pressurise the Asean from taking sides. Its plans of governing military bases and increased access in the Indian Ocean Region will remain unaffected with strengthening of the Pakistan Navy. What then are the implications for India?
China after Ladakh
India should have to brace itself for China flexing its military and economic muscles, and could be the prime target to drive a wedge in Quad. China will show little restraint in keeping India contained within the subcontinent, a geo-strategy that it has followed for long. Earlier, it was mostly Pakistan that was useful to slow down India’s economic progress, create internal instability and channel its political and diplomatic energy in diverse directions. Now, Nepal and Sri Lanka have been added to that list with varying degrees of success.Militarily, the Ladakh tensions have temporarily eased. But further progress of disengagement and de-escalation awaited. China would have hopefully learnt the lessons on limitations of military power against adversaries whose stakes are higher and may be willing to risk escalation. If China’s Ladakh objective was related to warning India against a US tilt, the main strategic outcome has certainly worked against it and instead energised the Quad. But it also means that Beijing will strengthen its military efforts to redirect India’s resources towards the defence of the northern border so as to slow us down from emerging as a powerful maritime entity. Small doses of military tensions coupled with actions aimed to debilitate the economy, should be expected.The other prong of containment are India’s neighbours. Despite the ceasefire on the Line of Control, Pakistan’s support for terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir is likely to continue. With the US withdrawal from Afghanistan hanging in the balance, Pakistan’s Afghanistan engagement may deepen. China’s recent political machinations in Nepal have not followed its script but its presence and ability to create trouble for India through Nepal will endure. China’s efforts with Bhutan and Bangladesh have not met with much success. But Sri Lanka is vulnerable and would require continued engagement. The coup in Myanmar requires deft handling and has the potential for slowing down the execution of the China Myanmar Economic Corridor. Overall, India has geographic proximity, historical and cultural affiliations on its side. But it has various unresolved issues with each of its neighbours, and capability for assistance is now impacted by a weakened economy. China is the outsider with economic clout but cultural affinity is low. Also, our neighbours can be expected to play both sides. It is not going to be easy for India, at all.
India needs domestic stability, resilient economy
India’s ability to deal with China’s multiple prongs in the subcontinent is intimately connected to the goings on in its domestic polity. With a neutered opposition, the ruling elite now enjoys unbridled power. However, the Hindu majoritarian impulse in the populace has deepened communal polarisation. Several key institutions that have to act as constitutional safeguards have been deliberately weakened by depriving them of power for independent functioning. Key constitutional pillars of democracy and federal structure of the nation are being undermined, with the latest being the attempts by the central government to render the Delhi UT government ineffectual. Coupled with the economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic and large scale unemployment, the evolving cocktail for possible internal discord could seriously hinder India’s capacity to contest China’s influence on the neighbouring nations. This factor may act as a primary drag, even if other foreign policy measures succeed.In many ways, the Quad may mark an important strategic milestone in contemporary global affairs. However, India would also require more economic and technological support from Quad partners. In this pursuit, strategic autonomy will be stressed. Also, the Quad’s effectiveness would be enhanced if other powers are incorporated, depending on the issue being tackled and interests involved. It might increase options of many other nations from being overwhelmed by China’s coercion. China’s reactions can be expected to increase probability of varying forms of conflicts at global and regional level. India, now having come to realise the true nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), must not waste time in determining its strategic trajectory.The global geopolitical chess game is moving fast. For India, there is no better way than internal consolidation, accompanied by increased cooperation with nations across the globe and with its immediate neighbours being a top priority area. Strategic tide is turning and India’s domestic political motor will be on test.
Why did India close Jalalabad consulate?
India dives into Quad waters
Chinese Communist Party has goals. India needs to have its own, not just respond to aggression
This article was originally published in ThePrintThere are glaring dissimilarities in India’s foreign policy stances towards China post the military disengagement in Doklam 2017 and the ongoing one in Ladakh. The former was followed by a reset that resembled closeness and acquiescence through informal summits in Wuhan and Mamallapuram while the latter seems to have prompted a distancing from China that was exemplified in the elevation of the Quad meeting to the level of political leadership on 12 March 2021 wherein Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that “members of the Quad will be closer than ever before”. Remarkably, for the first time, a joint statement was issued which was followed up by a joint article by the Quad leaders was also published in The Washington Post and China’s reaction is awaited. Meanwhile, it was not surprising that China was stalling the disengagement process in Ladakh.
While one can endlessly speculate on China’s motives in Doklam and Ladakh, what matters ultimately is the strategic effect of Chinese military aggression on India. Loss of trust cannot be cranked up impetuously. In any case, the Wuhan and Mamallapuram facade has perished and the reality of China’s perennial perfidy should forewarn and prepare us to exercise greater circumspection and watchfulness.
Why China is the Kautilya of international politics
This article was first published in ThePrintThe gameplay on the chessboard of global politics continues to cast its shadow on India’s relationships with the United States, China, nations of the sub-continent, and within its own federal units. For the skeptics of Kautilya’s continued relevance, the contemporary geopolitical chessboard underlines the chief tenets of Kautilyan rajamandala, or ‘circle of states’ – a concentric, geopolitical conception of the inter-state realm typifying friend-foe relationships.
Ironically, if there is one country that eminently exemplifies the Kautilyan template in international conduct, it is China – who was till the Ladakh episode, the quintessential madhyama (middle king) of the inter-state realm. A middle king is defined as “one with territory immediately proximate to those of the Ari (enemy) and the conqueror (hypothetically Pakistan and India respectively), capable of helping them when they are united or disunited and of suppressing them when they are disunited.” True to this definition, China had skilfully calibrated its dynamics with Pakistan and India. It had entered into a negotiated agreement (samdhi) with India (roughly co-equal then) through the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement of 1993 and several other agreements of 1996, 2003 and 2012, at a time when a stable neighbourhood was vital for its economic growth.