Commentary
Find our newspaper columns, blogs, and other commentary pieces in this section. Our research focuses on Advanced Biology, High-Tech Geopolitics, Strategic Studies, Indo-Pacific Studies & Economic Policy
‘Gray zone’ intrigue may derail Russia-Japan cooperation
Read the Full Text of the Article on Asia Times Rightly or wrongly, Moscow may interpret recent events as ‘war by other means’ waged by US ally JapanRussia and its adversaries are equally obsessed with a full spectrum of “gray zone” activities, including high-tech military, industrial and corporate espionage. While Russia does not see Japan as an adversary, it feels uncomfortable with Japan’s close ties to the US.The contemporary Russia-Japan relationship is complicated, with worrying trends signaling possible derailment of their bilateral ties in some fields.While the direction of great-power relations is rightly gauged from policy moves and summits, the shadowy world of espionage and spies, while overtly aligned with policy and polity, covertly operates to secure national interests, making no concessions, even to allies.Over the past few weeks, a curious case of alleged espionage has been grabbing headlines in Japan. Kazuo Miyasaka, the 70-year-old former owner of a technical research firm, was reportedly apprehended by the police for allegedly passing on high-tech military secrets to a member of the Russian trade representative mission in Japan.Miyasaka is believed to have betrayed secrets related to the US Space Force’s unmanned X-37B spacecraft, among other advanced systems.Read the Full Text of the Article on Asia Times All views are personal and do not reflect the recommendations of the Takshashila Institution
Should India Worry About China's Naval Fleet in Indian Ocean?
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) of the 21st century represents a geopolitical hotspot. Power politics is gaining traction in the region, with China attempting to form a leading presence in the vast waters surrounding the Indian subcontinent. In the context of (i) strategic identity, (ii) naval modernization and (iii) limitation in power, this article attempts to understand Chinese ambitions in the Indian ocean and argues that although the IOR will remain an Indian dominated region for the present, we cannot ignore the aggressive approach from China as a result of its highly ambitious foreign policy and increasing activities there.This article originally appeared in The Quint. You can read the full article here.
How to Beat China in the High-Tech Race
The near-daily cadence of reports highlighting China's growing technology prowess has set the cat among the pigeons in many democracies. In response, these countries are now offering higher subsidies and fatter incentives to increase the competitiveness of their own technology industries.
The US Senate, for instance, passed a $250 billion Innovation and Competition bill on 8th June aimed at outpacing China. The Indian government, since last year, has launched Product Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes for 13 sectors worth ₹2 trillion, some of them targeted at high-tech industries such as semiconductors, telecom, and networking. Earlier this month, a draft growth strategy of the Japanese government also promised generous financial incentives to attract cutting-edge chip-making facilities. Not to be left behind, the EU, too, has announced a €145 billion plan to upgrade its semiconductor and electronics manufacturing.
While the intent is encouraging, it's interesting to note that all these plans are qualitatively quite similar to China's 'Made in China 2025' — a state-led industrial policy for technology. Released in 2015, it was labelled as a threat to global trade for channelling state subsidies to achieve import substitution. But now, many countries seem to be following a similar approach. Of course, China's subsidies are often discriminatory and place extreme restrictions on foreign investment. Even so, all these policies mirror China's at their core — they are all about using old-style industrial policy instruments such as subsidies and incentives to achieve high-tech self-sufficiency.Read the full article in Times of India. Views are personal
Cyber Threats now sit alongside Nuclear Ones
The US-Russian meeting in Geneva on 15 June signified an attempt by both sides to arrest the pace of a worsening relationship. The US, as the aggrieved party, accused the Russians of cyberattacks. US President Joe Biden handed over a list of 16 ‘critical infrastructure’ entities and warned that if they were attacked, the US will respond in a ‘cyber way’. Russian President Vladimir Putin denied culpability for any attacks and held the US responsible for several malicious cyber campaigns in Russia. Both parties have, however, agreed to the creation of working groups for urgent arms control and cyber issues.
Cyber now sits alongside nuclear threats, and it is definitely a promotion in the value chain of strategic affairs. The US is concerned and there are good reasons for it. India should be too.
The Pandemic has shown how Dysfunctional our World Order is
The Galwan Valley One Year On: What's Changed with China and the PLA?
This month marks the first anniversary of the Galwan Valley clash between China and India, which resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian and at least four PLA soldiers. It also marks the first fatalities on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in over 45 years resulting from China’s attempts to change the status quo forcefully in Ladakh. The initial Chinese incursion was located at four points — Pangong Tso, the approach roads to the Depsang Plain, Gogra and Hotspring areas and Galwan Valley — which both China and India consider to be on their side of the LAC but were previously controlled by New Delhi. The Galwan Valley clash on the night of 15 June 2020 shattered three decades of trust and confidence established by five pacts signed between 1993 and 2012. In the days that followed, both sides deployed over two army divisions, battle tanks, self-propelled howitzers and surface to air missiles to Ladakh. Both sides also deployed fighter, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft and drones at forward bases near the border. In August 2020, India carried out a “pre-emptive” operation on Pangong Tso’s south bank to strengthen its on-ground position and create leverage while negotiating a Chinese withdrawal.
Today, after thirteen months of friction, eleven rounds of Corps Commander-level meetings, seven Work Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) meetings and at least two known interactions between India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the two sides have only disengaged at Galwan and Pangong Tso. The stand-off in Ladakh continues at other friction points. In his recent interview, India’s Chief of Army Staff, Gen MM. Naravane highlighted that India continues to maintain a significant troop presence along the entire border. Heightened tensions and a forward Sino-Indian military presence on the LAC seem to be the new status quo. But four specific developments on the Chinese side since the Galwan incident could further impact the LAC dispute in the future. Some are a direct result of the ongoing military stand-off, while others are a part of the broader PLA restructuring and China’s evolving military strategy.
This was originally published on 9Dashline, please read the whole article using the link.
High time Indian Foreign Policy jettisons ‘don’t annoy China’ notion & Supports Virus Probe
Of late, Covid-19 has been getting a geopolitical boost from the tailwinds of political and scientific narratives originating primarily from the US. In May, US President Joe Biden ordered an intelligence probe into the origins of the novel coronavirus or SARS-CoV-2. The fact that it originated in China is undisputed. Scientific suspicions that the virus is an artificial creation and probably leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology have now received a booster dose. Anthony Fauci, the Chief Medical Adviser to the US President, stated that he never played down the possibility of the lab leak in China for political reasons. In the last few weeks, a slew of scientific papers have reinforced the lab leak theory, with the G7 and the European Union adding political traction to the call for concerted action to uncover the truth. International politics has now inserted itself into the investigative process and is gaining momentum within the spaces of scientific doubts regarding the origin of the virus. In the long run, the scientific quest for facts draped in political free play could eventually be the information missile that could do a lot of damage to China.In the case of Covid-19, science, geography and politics could create a potent brew in the information age. In global geopolitics, this could become deadly for China. For China’s detractors, it might provide informational fuel and create the psychological effect that can, at the global level, drive popular anger directed against the country. It is an anger that has the potential to sustain because of the colossal damage caused by Covid to lives and livelihood.Read the full article in ThePrint
Five Trends in India-China Ties a Year after the Galwan Valley clash
The June 2020 clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers in the Galwan Valley has frequently been termed as a watershed moment in the history of bilateral relations. The incident marked the first loss of life in conflict along the boundary between the two countries in over four decades. A year later, while some equations have shifted, there has not been a sudden break — rather, ties appear to be drifting towards greater contestation with a certain ambivalence evident on both sides. This is underscored by five key trends.Read the full article in the Quint here.
What the COVID-19 Second Wave tells us about Twitter
The Covid-19 pandemic has given us several painful images in the last two years. During the first wave, the image that stayed with us was of migrant workers walking inhuman distances in the wake of an arbitrary national lockdown.During the second wave, the enduring image has been that of our social media feeds awash with desperate calls for help. Yet, amidst the shortage of critical medical equipment and the overflowing of cremation grounds, one cannot help but be struck by the great altruism and activism of thousands of regular social media users.Read the full article on Indian Express
Govt owes Indians an Explanation. Or its Gag Order & Pension Rule can be seen as Blackmail
Gag orders are increasingly being issued globally in this information age and becoming fashionable even in democracies. India is also in this race. Former US President Donald Trump’s gag orders were directed at serving government officials and deemed illegal. India seems to be a step ahead of the US, as its latest gag orders have a particular category of retired officials as their target. The Union government’s new order bars retired civil servants who worked in India’s security and intelligence bodies from publishing “details involving the affairs of the organisation without clearance from the head of the organisation”. Violation of procedure will lead to stoppage of pension.
The gag order was issued on 31 May through a notification by the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) that is directly under the PMO. The notification inserts an amendment to the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, and is applicable only to the central services cadre, including the Indian Foreign Service. It is not applicable to the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), Indian Police Service (IPS) and Indian Forest Service (IFS) because they belong to the All India Services. It also does not include the armed forces.Read the full article in ThePrint
Don’t rush into Sainik School public-private partnership. It can dilute and corrupt
Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, in her 2021-22 Budget speech, announced the Narendra Modi government’s intention of setting up an additional 100 Sainik Schools in partnership with NGOs, private schools and states. The move was received positively. There is, however, a need for caution and further introspection.
The initiative renews India’s involvement with schools established with the intent to provide future military leaders. The first wave began in 1922 with the setting up of the Royal Indian Military College (RIMC), Dehradun, and was followed up by the five Royal Indian Military Schools (RMS). It was part of an effort to Indianise the officer cadre of the British Indian Army. The British believed that public school education would make them suitable for the rigours and self-discipline of Army life. These schools are now controlled, financed and administered by the Army.
The banal geopolitical fallout of the laboratory leak hypothesis
On 11 September 2001, the US suffered four coordinated terrorist attacks that claimed nearly 3,000 lives, injured over 25,000 people and caused at least $10 billion in property damage. Within hours, the US National Security Agency had intercepted phone calls that led them to suspect Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda of having planned and carried out the attacks. On that same evening, the CIA director confirmed this assessment to the US president. In two weeks, the FBI identified the specific attackers, and by the end of the month had published photographs and nationalities of all 19 terrorists who carried out the attacks. Of them were 15 Saudis, two Emiratis, a Lebanese and an Egyptian. Bin Laden himself was a Saudi national and Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, a key conspirator, was Pakistani. The US authorities knew Bin Laden and his outfit quite well, for they had together fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, along with the Saudi and Pakistani intelligence agencies. So it is fair to say that one would have to have one’s head firmly buried in the sand to miss the glaring Saudi and Pakistani links to—and possible complicity in—the attacks.Read the full article in The Mint
Preparing for the waves
US shifting its Tibet stance. When will India end its silence?
The Dalai Lama’s succession may be stirring the pot of Buddhism at the global geopolitical table. China’s sensitivity to Tibetan issues has long been viewed by some nations as having a high potential for leverage in the conduct of relations with it. But Donald Trump shook up the Tibetan pot in December 2020 when he signed into law the Tibetan Policy and Support Act 2020 or TPSA and changed the contours of the earlier US policy, which under the Barack Obama administration had sacrificed the region’s interests in order to foster better US-China relations.
The TPSA declares that the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan Buddhist leaders are religious matters and all decisions pertaining to reincarnations rest solely with the Tibetan Buddhist faith community based on the instructions of the 14th Dalai Lama and without interference by the government of the People’s Republic of China. The law also acknowledges the Central Tibetan Administration (the Government in Exile in Dharamshala) that is committed to peacefully negotiating its status as an autonomous entity within China. Last month, the Biden administration opted to continue the Trump policy.Read the full article in ThePrint
India’s gamble on China failed in Ladakh. But there’s a new risk worth taking
The deadlock on military de-escalation in Ladakh continues. It might turn out to be another example of China’s perfidy. India has had sufficient historical experience with China’s use of agreements for buying time and deceiving us. The 2018 agreement for defusing the crisis in Doklam and its subsequent military occupation of the rest of the Doklam plateau is fresh in memory. It should have warned us about the dangers of China getting India to withdraw from a tactically advantageous position at the Kailash Range in Ladakh and then using delay tactics to keep India under pressure.
China’s strategic behaviour can only be interpreted if one views the military moves in Ladakh in the broader perspective of China-US geopolitical rivalry. China’s ambitions that generate its geopolitical compulsions are no longer being concealed. Xi Jinping is claiming that the US and China are now virtually equal powers and it is only a matter of time before China surpasses America economically and, if some Chinese claims are to be believed, even technologically. At the same time, China believes India can be an impediment to its ambitions. But only if India’s partnership with the US exploits a geographic reality steeped in the maritime domain and threatens China’s dreams of predominance at the global and regional geopolitical table.Read the full article in ThePrint
Focus on getting on most of India vaccinated as quickly as possible
Blaming the government’s pandemic response? Do it for the right reasons
The Union government has received a lot of flak over its management of the pandemic response, and deservedly so. But I want to look at three incorrect — or at least problematic — frames being used to blame the government’s pandemic response, inadequate and confused as it already is. The intention is to focus on questions that matter.Incorrect Frame #1: Blame Vaccine DiplomacyAs cases have skyrocketed and vaccine supplies have plummeted, India’s vaccine diplomacy has come under the scanner. Today’s dominant narrative is that by prioritising vaccine exports over domestic inoculation, India did a disservice to its people. I disagree. It’s not altruism but national self-interest that guides international humanitarian assistance efforts by all states. By giving away vaccines to smaller states in the subcontinent, India signalled the positive role it can play in the world order. Another way of thinking about vaccine diplomacy is to think of its opportunity cost. At the current vaccination rate, India would’ve had just five additional days of supplies had it not given any of the nearly 10.7 million doses as gifts to other countries. A majority of the deliveries (almost 35 million) have been under commercial terms between manufacturers and other countries. Moreover, had India blocked commercial exports earlier, India would’ve received much less enthusiastic support from other countries in this moment of crisis.Holding the Union government accountable for its mistakes is essential. Equally important is identifying what the exact error was. The original sin was not placing enough vaccine orders because the government was complacent about having conquered the virus. It calculated that the pandemic would peter out even with a snail-paced domestic vaccination campaign.By internalising that India was wrong in extending its help to other countries in its own time of predicament, we would be learning the wrong lesson. Such heuristics tend to stick around for long in the Indian strategic affairs community. Try arguing for developing overseas operations military capability of any kind, and the idea will be shot down, citing the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPFK) failure in Sri Lanka nearly three decades ago. Vaccine diplomacy mustn’t be perceived as another IPKF moment.Read the full article in Times of IndiaImage credits: Illustration by Freepik Storyset
India and Vietnam should improve their defence ties
India and Vietnam held their second maritime security dialogue recently. A press release by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) stated that both countries discussed developments in the domain of “maritime security, regional cooperation activities and opportunities for cooperation between the two countries.” Multiple such discussions have taken place between India and Vietnam in recent years. But, the underlying question is - to what extent have these promises been turned into reality? Both India and Vietnam have highlighted the need to work towards achieving a peaceful, stable, secure, free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific region. It is crucial to look into what has been achieved to date and how India can elevate this relationship to promise a better security future for both nations.
A common threat
India and Vietnam both have long-standing territorial disputes with China. And Beijing’s increasing aggressive posture with regard to these is a concern for both countries. For instance, the ongoing standoff in Eastern Ladakh is an example of the tense relationship between Beijing and New Delhi. With complete disengagement and de-escalation unlikely in the near terms, India’s focus should be equally directed towards protecting its maritime domain and, more importantly, upholding its vision of a rule-based, free, open and secure region.
Similarly, conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea (SCS) have been a point of contention between Vietnam and China for a long time. It is only accelerating as Beijing is becoming more aggressive in its approaches and claims of sovereignty. The recent controversy surrounding Chinese vessels present in the Whitsun Reef is an example of this. Chinese vessels are increasing activity in other islands too. A spokesperson from Hanoi recently said, “The activities of Chinese vessels within the territorial sea around of Sinh Ton Dong in Vietnams Truong Sa Islands violate Vietnams sovereignty and the provisions of UNCLOS”. Vietnam was sharply critical of Chinese actions in this regard. For India, the SCS is also an important trading route. About $200 billion worth of trade passes through the region with many citizens working and investing in ASEAN countries, like China and Japan. Any aggression by Beijing in the region directly impacts India’s economic interests. This necessitates India to work with partners in the region like Vietnam.
Naval and security cooperation has seen positive success
India and Vietnam have made significant progress on agreements related to elevating defence and naval cooperation. Yet, more needs to be done to materialise these goals. Since upgrading their partnership to a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ (CSP) in 2016, a wide range of institutionalised dialogues have taken place, with many agreements being signed. Some include; the 7th Strategic Dialogue held in April 2018 and the first India-Vietnam Maritime Security Dialogue held in March 2019. A recent summit in December 2020 was noteworthy, as both Prime Ministers signed a Plan of Action for 2021-2023. In their joint statement, the two leaders expressed satisfaction over the successful implementation of the High-Speed Guard Boat (HSGB) Manufacturing Project for Vietnam Border Guard Command under the US$ 100 million Defence Line of Credit extended by the Government of India to Vietnam.
Naval cooperation in the form of joint exercises, training and friendly port visits has seen considerable progress. In December 2020, the navies of India and Vietnam commenced a series of exercises in the South China Sea to develop maritime interoperability. Vietnamese ships have participated in multilateral naval exercises hosted by India, such as MILAN and the Indian Navy hosted an international fleet review held in Visakhapatnam in 2016. Furthermore, coastguards and naval officers from both sides have been in regular dialogue over the years and continue to do so.
Limitations in the supply of defence equipment
In terms of defence procurements, the two countries are faced with some level of ambiguity. In 2014, India offered the BrahMos, an anti-ship cruise missile to Vietnam. But no real progress has been seen since then, apart from intermittent talks. Lack of funding has been stated as a reason for the deal not being materialised. Another reason being speculated is a fear of Beijing. In the wake of China strengthening ties with India’s adversaries, like Pakistan, the latter seems to be hesitant to accelerate equipment supply to immediate neighbourhood countries. However, the latest hurdle comes with the US’s Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions or CAATSA, which can halt sales through arbitrary embargoes. As the BrahMos cruise missiles are locally manufactured in collaboration with Russia, it depends on Moscow’s critical components, liable to sanctions under CAATSA. Such sanctions could halt the Indian governments move of a fast-track export of such missiles to the recipient countries, namely Vietnam. India needs to effectively deal with such obstacles if it wants to boost its material exports fivefold to $5 billion by 2025.
Since 2016, Vietnam and India have been in talks regarding the potential sale of the Varunastra Torpedo. Finally, in 2018, the anti-submarine torpedo was inducted into the Indian Navy. Still, the development process took more time than expected, according to the Navy chief admiral Sunil Lamba and DRDO chief S Christopher. "We need to work towards a reasonable time-frame from concept to realisation to address our capability gap in time,’’ the former said. Several other reasons listed for the delay included the availability of ships and submarines to test numerous aspects of technology. When Vietnam will receive the vessel is still unclear, though.
The Indian government must carefully overlook such lapses and effectively carry out defence exports if it intends to strengthen its defence partnership with Vietnam to the fullest. With China ramping up its Belt and Road Initiative, it is time for India to maintain a coherent export policy with Asia to transform its ‘Act East Policy’.
A top Army doctor transferred in middle of pandemic says a lot about India’s civil-military ties
In India’s military history, sacking a field commander during the course of a battle has been rare. Even if done, it is usually the judgement call of the top military leadership and not of a politician. That norm has now been shaken in a different type of war – by the sudden removal of Major General Vasu Vardhan, the Commandant of Delhi’s Army Base Hospital, who was a critical field commander in the military’s battle against the Covid-19 pandemic.
The authority to take such a decision rests with the defence minister. The official justification that it is a routine transfer and merely a part of a larger human resource management exercise will not fool anyone and is an insult to basic intelligence. The medical pedigree of Maj. Gen. Vardhan is impeccable. He is the topmost pulmonologist in the Army, a branch of medicine at the forefront of the war against the pandemic. His professional competence was not in question and he had only three more months to go before retirement. Some attempts are being made on social media to tarnish the image of Maj. Gen. Vardhan by questioning his administrative abilities.
From my personal interaction with several recovered Covid patients, it is clear that the Base Hospital’s handling of this challenging situation has been commendable. The performance of the hard-pressed staff has been widely praised.There is definitely more than what meets the eye.
What about military ethics?
It is well known that the Commandant was faced with a severe shortage of beds, medical support facilities and staff. It is possible that the Commandant’s transfer was provoked by his resistance to accommodate non-entitled persons or provide critical medicines in short supply to persons not authorised but who perhaps were being sent by the Ministry of Defence with the Directorate General of Armed Forces Medical Service (DGAFMS) acting as a conduit. Such unreasonable demands could also have been made by the military. Whatever the actual detail, Maj. Gen. Vardhan stood his moral ground when asked to carry out actions that were unauthorised and violated ethical and professional standards.The Commandant could have crossed paths with the Army brass, the political leadership, or both. If it was only with the Army, the Ministry of Defence would have certainly questioned the removal, and the file would never have been processed and cleared with such speed. Postings of Major Generals and above require the defence minister’s signature. Even if the Army leadership had objected to the move, they must have been overruled. But the military’s top leadership can be exculpated, only if they have put their objections in writing and tried to hold the hand of a subordinate who has taken an ethical stand. If the military has not objected in writing or the Ministry of Defence has decided despite written objections, then the matter suggests a certain degree of politicisation of the military and exposes the merging of military ethics with that of the civil society.It can be reasonably assumed that after being Commandant of the Army Base Hospital for 18 months and with only three months to retire, it is a punishment posting. A tool that is well known and used to put people in their place, and which politicians routinely use to keep the civil services in check. Percolation of such practices into the armed forces would be severely harmful to its institutional culture, which is on a different plane altogether.If the above explanation is indeed true, the Ministry of Defence’s actions are ethically questionable and bring to the fore the pathologies that afflict India’s civil-military relations.
An ethical failure
As explained in my column last week, the danger wrought by politicisation of India’s military is not so much of a coup, but one in which the constitutional gap between the military and party in power is narrowed and misused. Parenthetically, the medical component of the armed forces under the DGAFMS is placed directly under the defence secretary in the Department of Defence and all attempts to place it under the Integrated Defence Staff have been successfully thwarted. It is an open secret that due to structural proximity, over a period of time, the higher military medical fraternity has established a reciprocal and cosy relationship with the civilian power centres in the Ministry of Defence. The civilians are believed to be provided mostly unauthorised access to medical care especially in the premier Research & Referral (R&R) Hospital in Delhi. Reciprocally, postings, promotions and approval for premature retirement are taken care of.
The structural relationship of the medical services exposes the pathologies of the proximity and control in civil-military interactions. The recently created Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and induction of uniformed personnel in integrated civil organisations like the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) could be similarly infected if lessons learnt from the medical services experience is ignored. For, eventually, the ethical fibre of the uniform should not fray when blended with civilian moral values, which are far less stringent.The Ministry of Defence has taken an action and is hiding behind a body of seeming falsehoods. Since the official reason is that it is a routine move, the file contents can be known through RTI. If the Army has not objected and the Ministry of Defence has also not questioned the move, the falsehood stands exposed. It also exposed if the Army has objected and the Ministry of Defence has overruled. Agreeably, once the defence minister has authorised the posting, the Armed Forces have no option but to implement it. Regrettably, it seems that the military leadership has opted to be part of the cover-up and this is reflected in its detailed official statement. The defence ministry and the Army’s reaction to the transfer of Maj. Gen. Vasu Vardhan signals to all others the price that they will have to pay if they do not bend even though their stand upholds the highest and precious value of the uniform – its ethical rectitude. The politico-military reaction is an ethical failure, the resonance of which will reverberate down the line.
Between obedience and conformity
The ultimate strength of India’s armed forces is its spirit of sacrifice, and of unfailingly placing the nation before self. While soldiers on the front line are duty-bound to risk their lives, the military leadership is expected to play a role as exemplars who protect the military institution from the negotiable morals that are frequently observed to be the normal fare in our society. It finally boils down to their willingness to sacrifice personal gain in terms of promotions and postings, which the civilians control.The heart of the problem is the growing ability of politico-bureaucratic authorities to bend the rules and the simultaneous failure of the military leadership to stand their moral ground. Though Maj. Gen. Vardhan’s case can easily be dismissed as sui generis even as the official explanation passes it off as a routine HR move, the warning signs may be ominous. Over a period of time, such signals from the top hierarchy can only weaken the military’s ethical fabric leading to the moral factor losing its weight to reflect in personal behaviour. What requires to be understood is that obedience to authority and conforming to questionable morals are two entirely different things.The potential toxic combination is of the political leadership’s inappropriate actions being supported by the ethical frailty of the higher military leadership. The combination could be dealt with by appointing a defence minister with a military background who is known for their ethical credentials and professional competence. In the existing ambience, the civil-military module requires political support to deliver quick and effective results. Fortuitously, unlike the dynamics of civil society, military’s special legal provisions and disciplined character make it feasible to rein in ethical weakness that could have seeped into its institutional culture. All it requires is for the higher military leadership to set an example and ruthlessly implement it.There is indeed a fine line between obedience and conformity in civil-military relations. Obedience is mandatory but conformity by the military to the ethical value system of civil society could be deleterious to India.Lt Gen Prakash Menon (retd) is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution, and former military adviser, National Security Council Secretariat. Views are personal. This article first appeared in ThePrint
Has the world of work changed forever?
This article was first published in Deccan Herald. Views are personal.We are so far into this pandemic that I, along with most people around me, seem to have forgotten what the world looked like before the apocalypse. The Seth household (like a lot of other people) is pretty dependent on Netflix and Amazon Prime for entertainment. Every so often, while binging a TV show, we come across a scene that seems like it belongs in a different reality. Last week, while streaming The Office, I found it hard to imagine working from a common shared space with my colleagues. I have commuted to and from offices for most of my professional life and have sat in more meetings than I can count. Meetings are one thing I do not miss from before the pandemic. When in an office, meetings can stretch for hours on end. Sometimes they serve as a direct proxy to how productive your colleagues perceive you to be. They also required you to be physically present with your expressions visible and did not leave a lot of scope for you to get other work done. I distinctly remember a colleague saying to me in Delhi’s scorching heat, “Hum log office kaam karne ke liye nahi aate, meetings karne ke liye aate hain. Kaam to ghar pe karna hota hai” (We don’t come to the office to work, we come here to attend meetings. You are supposed to get work done on your own time). Enter 2020, and the world was thrust into the largest work from home experiment in the history of civilisation. Commutes became non-existent, and meetings became long conference calls on Zoom and MS Teams. You no longer had to drop everything to attend meetings, no longer had to show your face and expressions to colleagues throughout, could turn cameras and mics off, and perhaps most importantly, work in the background until someone called your name. Working from home during the pandemic, the new meeting culture has given me more control over my schedule. This made me question whether I was the only one going through this transition. Thankfully, research by the Harvard Business Review was able to provide me with some answers. (A slight caveat here; the data used in the study is from 2013 and 2020, but it has not explicitly not focused on India, and while I do not think it undermines its application, we should take it with a pinch of salt). The pandemic seems to be a net positive for knowledge workers. We are spending 12% less time being drawn into meetings and participating in 50% more activities through personal choice. The number of tasks rated as tiresome has also dropped from 27%-12%, meaning we are picking our battles better. This also means that on the flip side, we are finding it harder to start new initiatives or focus on personal development. In short, we have more control over our calendars and the message from knowledge workers here seems to be, “Stop! Stop! It hurts so good”. As with so many things from the pandemic, I hope that we take our learnings from this experience into our future. When I read about the future of work, many people talk in binaries of 0s and 1s on whether we will go back to offices or continue to work from home. I do not claim to know the answer. What I do know, however, is that we seem to prefer the current arrangement of meetings over the previous status quo. And if there is one thing we should take into our post-pandemic future of work, it is that people be given more freedom on how to use their time, starting with meetings.