Science and State Power in China

In May 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping placed an ambitious proposition before the leaders of the country’s scientific community. He called on them to “aim for the frontiers of science and technology” and emerge as the “vanguards in innovation in the new era.” The overarching objective, he said, was for China to become a “major world centre for science and innovation.” This, for Xi, is one of the “responsibilities bestowed by history” upon China’s scientific community. For him, the development of science and technology is a strategic imperative. It’s what will drive future growth and ensure China’s security, overall competitiveness and global standing.At the heart of Xi’s emphasis on and investment in science and technology, therefore, is the goal of enhancing state power. This perspective is not exclusive to the current Chinese leadership. It is the product of historical debate over the role of science and technology in Chinese society. The origins of this conversation can be dated back to the last few decades of the Qing Dynasty, which ended in 1912. Since then, while strengthening state power has remained the core objective of the pursuit of scientific advancement, each generation of leaders has adopted a different pathway. [Read More...]

How to respond to an 'intelligent' PLA

Advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies over the next decade will have a profound impact on the nature of warfare. Increasing use of precision weapons, training simulations and unmanned vehicles are merely the tip of the iceberg. AI technologies, going forward, will not only have a direct battlefield impact in terms of weapons and equipment but will also impact planning, logistics and decision-making, requiring new ethical and doctrinal thinking. From an Indian perspective, China’s strategic focus on leveraging AI has serious national security implications.Read the full article on the Deccan Herald website.

What does China’s new defence strategy mean?

China on Wednesday published its first defence white paper in four years, outlining the strategic military guideline for what it terms as a new era. The document offers an insight into Beijing’s view of the changes in the international security situation. It discusses China’s defence policy objectives, along with the reform, missions and tasks that its armed forces are undertaking. Further, it elaborates on the role of the armed forces in the broader Chinese geopolitical objective of establishing a community with a shared future for mankind. Here are five key takeaways from the white paper. The line taken by the document indicates a generally positive outlook towards India. Nevertheless, there are certain potential points of impact to be noted from the perspective of Indian interests.Shifting Balance of PowerThe white paper begins with an assessment of the changes in the international security environment. It argues that the world is increasingly heading towards multipolarity. But, it isn't yet a “tranquil place,” with strategic competition on the rise. Beijing’s diagnosis is that “the configuration of strategic power is becoming more balanced,” with the strength of emerging markets and developing countries growing. The big threat to this is the change in American policy, i.e., “growing hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism”.This necessitates a reinforcement of the UN’s role in global security, strengthening new regional security arrangements, establishing security partnerships (with Russia, for instance), investments in better weapons and technological upgrades and bolstering arms control and non-proliferation regimes. For New Delhi, which has been working on getting Beijing to yield on its admission to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the white paper’s assessment of the international non-proliferation regime as “compromised by pragmatism and double standards” is likely to be troubling.The Asia-Pacific ContestThe document observes that while the Asia-Pacific region is “generally stable”, there is increased “major country competition”. Essentially, it perceives the dynamics in the region within the framework of U.S.-China. frictions. The U.S., it argues, “is strengthening its Asia-Pacific military alliances and reinforcing military deployment and intervention”. The key partners for Washington that it identifies are South Korea, Japan and Australia. Despite that, the document largely assesses Chinese neighbourhood policy as having been successful.“Asia-Pacific countries are increasingly aware that they are members of a community with shared destiny”, it reads, hinting at the rapid emergence of a China-led security architecture. The constituents of this Sinosphere are structures like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, CICA, China’s expanding dominance in the South China Sea, dialogues with ASEAN members, regional counter-terror action and increasing bilateral military-to-military diplomacy. Interestingly, China views South Asia also as “generally stable,” although “conflicts between India and Pakistan flare up from time to time.” This suggests that Beijing is rather confident about its ability to manage tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad.BRI's Military ComponentEver since Xi Jinping launched, in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), there has been much debate about the security implications of Chinese investments around the world. The white paper tells us that protecting China’s overseas interests is a strategic objective for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It states that “one of the missions of China’s armed forces is to effectively protect the security and legitimate rights and interests of overseas Chinese people, organisations and institutions”. In order to do so, the document says that the PLA is building “far seas forces”, “overseas logistical facilities”, and capabilities for “diversified military tasks”. That’s followed by a glowing evaluation of the PLA’s Logistics Support Base in Djibouti, which was set up in 2017. This is perhaps the clearest admission of the emerging military component of the BRI. But that’s not all. Beijing is also likely to continue to invest in and focus on participation in Humanitarian and Disaster Relief operations internationally. This is couched within the rhetoric of providing international public goods. But such activities allow for the enhancement of Chinese forces’ operational skills and experience and normalises their presence in far-flung regions of the world.Resilient ChinaThe 2015 Chinese defence white paper had argued that “China faces a formidable task to maintain political security and social stability” while discussing Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet. In 2019, there’s a mention of “external separatist forces” with regard to Tibet and Xinjiang. But the forces seeking Taiwan’s “independence” are identified as the “gravest immediate threat”, with the use of force not being ruled out. Despite that, generally, the domestic security environment is assessed to have improved considerably. “China continues to enjoy political stability, ethnic unity and social stability. There has been a notable increase in China’s overall national strength, global influence, and resilience to risks,” the white paper says. However, it is also worth noting that “safeguarding national political security” and political work in the armed forces to uphold Xi Jinping’s status as the core of the Party-state system remain priorities.Quality and Efficiency

Arguably one of the most important components of the reforms that Xi has pursued has been the restructuring of the country’s armed forces. The white paper encapsulates this as the PLA striving to transform itself from a quantity-and-scale model to that of quality and efficiency. This entails a shift in focus from manpower to firepower and from personnel-intensive to science and technology-intensive forces, according to the white paper. The impact of this overarching shift in approach has meant organisational restructuring. That has involved a shift in the balance of different forces. Over the past few years, there has been a reduction in personnel numbers, particularly from the ground forces. The Second Artillery Force has been reconstituted as the PLA Rocket Force. New strategic support and logistics forces have been established. Greater attention has been paid to safeguarding interests in outer space, electromagnetic space and cyberspace. The white paper, in fact, identifies this as one of the nine fundamental goals of the PLA going forward. Its equipment-development policy and approach to combat, therefore, are evolving from mechanisation to “intelligentised warfare” and “informatisation”. That has led to a reassessment of training methods to ensure greater interoperability among forces. These are developments that New Delhi should be watching closely and factoring into its defence planning, given that they have a direct impact on India’s security interests.

This article was first published in The Hindu. Views are personal.

The three elements of China’s innovation model

In November 2018, the New York Times published a series that began with a story titled, The Land that Failed to Fail. The central argument of the piece is that defying Western expectations, the Communist Party has maintained its control in China while adopting elements of capitalism, eschewing political liberalisation, and pursuing innovation. The last of these three — innovation — is the subject of this piece.What drives innovation in China? This is not merely a question about the mechanics of policy, the might of capital, the determination of dogged entrepreneurs, or the brilliance that is conjured up in university dormitories. Increasingly, it is a question that has acquired geopolitical significance, not just in the context of power politics but also in the debate over fundamental values about the political and economic organisation. In other words, the question that China’s march towards becoming a “country of innovators” raises is whether a political system that prioritises control can foster genuine innovation.Answering this requires an understanding of the key elements of the Chinese model of innovation. To my mind, there are three key components of this model—state support, a systems approach towards the development of new technologies and businesses, and building an effective “bird-cage.” There are, of course, other factors like the pursuit of prestige, the desire to rebalance the economy, the need to enhance the effectiveness of governance, and the size of the consumer market, which supports innovation. But it is the first three components that form the key pillars of China’s innovation model.Read More...

The Answer is Blockchain

This is the third edition of The Jobscape, our fortnightly round-up of news and opinion on the state of employment and job creation in India. In this edition, Industry 4.0 holds a lot of hope for the future of jobs.Read more 

China’s big plan for AI domination is dazzling the world, but it has dangers built in. Here’s what India needs to watch out for.

In June, Niti Aayog published a discussion paper arguing that India has a significant stake in the artificial intelligence (AI) revolution and therefore needs to evolve a national AI strategy. The document examined policies and strategies issued by a number of countries that could inform the Indian approach.

China has been one of the early movers in the AI space, and evaluating its approach towards AI development can help identify important lessons for Indian policymakers and entrepreneurs.

In July 2017, China’s State Council published its AI plan, outlining the goal of becoming the world’s primary AI innovation centre by 2030. This is a comprehensive vision document, unlike “strategies” or “policies” put out by other key global players.

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Is the Jobs Crisis a Skills Crisis?

This is the second edition of The Jobscape, our fortnightly round-up of news and opinion on the state of employment and job creation in India. In this edition, there’s good news from renewable energy and the gig economy — but with a caveat: the skilling gap.Read more

Breaking down China’s AI ambitions

China unveiled a plan to develop the country into the world’s primary innovation centre for artificial intelligence in 2017. It identified AI as a strategic industry, crucial for enhancing economic development, national security, and governance.The Chinese government’s command innovation approach towards AI development is crafting a political economy that tolerates sub-optimal and even wasteful outcomes in the quest for expanding the scale of the industry. Consequently, the industry is likely to be plagued by concerns about overinvestment, overcapacity, quality of products, and global competitiveness.In addition, increasing friction over trade with other states and President Xi Jinping’s turn towards techno-nationalism along with tightening political control could further undermine China’s AI industry. Before we dive into the challenges, here’s some background.Read more here>