Takshashila Issue Brief - India’s Options against Chinese Military Aggression
The latest incursions by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Tawang sector in Arunachal Pradesh in early December are part of a new pattern of aggression. In recent years, incursions and standoffs have taken place in Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Sikkim.
Rapid infrastructure developments, construction of border villages, troop mobilisation, and build-ups, and deployment of aggressive military tactics along the border have also accompanied such intrusions. The loss of lives during the 2020 Galwan clash and the firing of arms at LAC for the first time in decades stand out as the dangers emanating from China’s current military strategy against India. There is no reason to believe that the pattern of Chinese transgressions is likely to stop in the coming years.
What explains China’s moves?
Under Xi Jinping, China has initiated a massive military reform and modernisation programme, beginning in 2015. A key part of this reform agenda is to safeguard what has been termed as China’s core interests. This includes territorial integrity, which has implications for the India-China boundary. China’s new land border law is further evidence of Beijing’s hardening position on the boundary issue. The law, which came into effect in January 2022, specifically states that “sovereignty and territorial integrity” are “sacred and inviolable.” Further, Xi’s politics have also unleashed a nationalistic fervour back home, and assertion about territorial interests is an important component of the domestic narrative. The lack of clarity with regard to the LAC and the so-called “differences in perception” provides a fertile ground for China’s expansionist tendencies to play out.
However, China’s intended objectives behind its border moves extend beyond mere territorial claims. China has used sustained military pressure under a certain threshold to not only change the status quo on the ground but also to signal to other countries, including India, its geopolitical strength and prominence, and force others to not align more closely with China’s competitors, especially the U.S. Thus, Chinese incursions and encroachments are also part of its toolkit to project power and engage in political signalling.
Given these considerations, the direct security threat to India from China is likely to continue.
What are India’s options?
While the Indian Army is well equipped to thwart Chinese incursions in the future, India’s options cannot remain limited to routine retaliation whenever the PLA transgresses into our side of the border. In order to upset China’s strategic calculations, India must adopt a range of other options.
Firstly, whenever the PLA intrudes on our borders or opens up a new front, India must not look for mutual de-escalation immediately. This is often interpreted as a sign of buckling under Chinese military pressure. Instead, India must look to deploy its Army and Air Force in a manner that signals that it is ready for longer and drawn-out tensions along the LAC. This is likely to counter China’s strategy of using sustained military pressure below a certain threshold to achieve its objective if India signals that it is ready to raise the stakes.
Secondly, while the Indian Army has fought back Chinese intruders during these clashes, India needs to identify and invest in more aggressive and asymmetric countermeasures to PLA’s actions. The how and when of retaliation is best left to the planners in the Indian military establishment. Apart from physical military maneuvers, this can also include electronic and information warfare through the deployment of India’s offensive cyber capabilities against China. The appropriate countermeasures will also depend on an evaluation of the PLA's investments, capabilities, and advancements in the border areas.
Finally, the priorities of the Indian national security establishment have remained focused on the land boundaries with Pakistan and China, its foremost adversaries. While India needs secure borders, it is also equally important to project power in the maritime domain, specifically the Indo-Pacific region.
This will not only bolster India’s maritime security but also act as a strategic counter to China’s naval expansion. And it can emerge as a new flashpoint where India enjoys the upper hand, given its geographical location, strategic partnerships, maritime experience, and awareness.
Effecting this strategy of rebalancing toward the maritime domain will involve three essential elements:
Any Chinese threats or actions along the LAC can be matched with an Indian counter in the oceans to increase pressure on China. Such escalation by India will not only demonstrate its maritime power but is likely to deter China from carrying out territorial transgressions along the LAC. India’s future theatre commands must account for such capabilities.
India must join countervailing coalitions against China, especially those which expand its power and influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Quad and participation in naval exercises are good starting points. But much more needs to be done across different domains. India must also take advantage of the fact that multiple other Southeast Asian countries are victims of China’s maritime aggression to emerge as a net security provider in the region. Military logistics and basing agreements with these countries can arise out of such steps by India.
India’s defence expenditure stands at only 2.1% of GDP and has fallen over the years. The allocation for the Indian Navy is only 17% of the total defence budget. Resource constraint is the biggest challenge as far as taking China on in the Indo-Pacific region is concerned. While increasing the defence expenditure is a tricky issue, it must begin with priority given to future security threats that India faces and the role of naval capabilities in countering them.
In conclusion, while we anticipate that China will continue to apply military pressure along the LAC and open more conflict zones in the future, only pressing for de-escalation and maintenance of peace on the border will not secure India’s interests. India must change its approach to dealing with China’s repeated intrusions; only a demonstration of credible military action can force China to change course.
This Takshashila Issue Brief has been compiled by Shrikrishna Upadhyaya, with inputs from Manoj Kewalramani.
December 30, 2022.
Further Reading:
Takshashila Discussion Document - An Indian Approach to Navigate China’s Rise by Manoj Kewalramani, Anirudh Kanisetti, Shibani Mehta, and Suyash Desai
Takshashila Discussion SlideDoc - India's China Reset - An Assessment by Manoj Kewalramani
ICWA Journal Article - Xi’s Military Reforms and its Efficacy in Furthering China’s National Security Objectives — The Takshashila Institution by Suyash Desai & Manoj Kewalramani
Takshashila Discussion SlideDoc - China’s Maritime Coercion Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic by Manoj Kewalramani, Suyash Desai, and Aditya Ramanathan
Takshashila Discussion SlideDoc - Assessing China's Engagement in the Indian Subcontinent by Manoj Kewalramani, Anirudh Kanisetti, and Hamsini Hariharan
Book Chapter - Neither Guns nor Butter: The Inconvenient Truth of India’s Defence Financing — The Takshashila Institution by Pranay Kotasthane
Pain & gain: Deterring China requires us to change Xi’s cost-benefit calculations by Nitin Pai
Yangtse showed Army capability but it's Navy that can shift balance of power in India's favour by Lt. Gen. Prakash Menon
