The Proposed Lok Sabha Seat Apportionment—What Should the Southern States Really Demand?
Published January 07, 2025 | This is a working paper presented at the Takshashila Institution Internal Conference on ‘Understanding the Delimitation Exercise’, November 2024
Authors
Abstract
We argue that states fearing a loss of political power due to the reapportionment of Lok Sabha seats based on the current population numbers should not oppose the exercise in totality. Instead, they should use this opportunity to strike a grand bargain to rebalance their political and economic powers in the Indian Union. To prevent a loss of political power, they should demand reforming representation in the Rajya Sabha, expanding the role of the Inter-state Council and splitting the state of Uttar Pradesh into smaller states. To prevent a loss of economic power, they should demand an increase in vertical devolution, a reduction in the Centrally Sponsored Schemes, and a revision of the Union, State, and Concurrent Lists. These much-needed changes can improve the outcomes for the states and their residents far more than postponing seat reapportionment.
Introduction
The 2029 General Election could be a watershed moment in Indian political history. We could see the Lok Sabha reconstituted not just in terms of the people elected to it but also in terms of new or revised constituencies and reapportionment of seats between different states of the Indian Union.
In the run-up to the elections, apportionment and delimitation will be a contentious issue both administratively and in the political battleground. The authors of this paper believe that ‘kicking the can’ on seat apportionment further down the road is imprudent and will only compound the problem. Instead, states should use this opportunity to reset the imbalances in the federal structure to lead to fair representation of states and good governance for their residents.
This paper seeks to add to the discourse on finding the politically optimal way to balance constitutional values of “vote-equality” and "federalism", which appear to be in contradiction in this instance. It tries to answer the question, “What could the states that oppose seat apportionment do? ” and seeks to provide a pathway to a fair and effective apportionment and delimitation exercise.
Background
In its original form, the Constitution mandated the apportionment and delimitation exercise to be done every ten years. Such Delimitation Commissions have been constituted four times – in 1952 under the Delimitation Commission Act, 1952, in 1963 under the Delimitation Commission Act, 1962, in 1973 under the Delimitation Act, 1972 and in 2002 under the Delimitation Act, 2002. The first parliament had 489 seats. As the population increased and new states were formed, this increased to 543 in 1971.
The first few decades after independence saw significant population growth in some states. Continuing this principle of equality would have meant that the states of UP, Bihar, and Rajasthan would gain seats in the reconstituted parliament at the expense of the political power of states witnessing lower population growth. In 1976, during the Emergency, a freeze on the number of seats was announced through the 42nd Amendment up to 2002. The justification for the freeze was said to be the population explosion that some northern states experienced in the first few decades. The political backlash forced a freeze on delimitation until 2002, aiming to give these states a chance at “controlling population growth”.
The freeze was extended in 2002 through the 84th Amendment until the first census conducted after 2026. As we approach the year of reckoning, it is time to reexamine the debate. Ideally, this issue would have come to a head after the decadal census in 2031 had the government followed the census schedule. However, this issue may come to the fore much earlier, when India embarks on a delayed decadal census pending from 2021. This could immediately be followed by the Apportionment and Delimitation exercise. We characterise this exercise as a trade-off between two fundamental features of the Constitution—Vote Equality and Federalism—for two reasons.
First, one of the founding principles of the Indian Constitution is that it follows the tenet of “One person-one vote” to ensure that each individual’s vote is valued equally. This means that the number of constituencies and voters within constituencies will change with changes in demographics. Articles 80-82 of the Indian constitution detail the provisions regarding proportional voting in the states. Article 81 requires that each state receives seats in proportion to its population, which creates constituencies of roughly equal size within the state.
Second, federalism as a principle is part of the basic structure of the constitution. The reduced number of seats due to the one person-one vote principle will mean that states that have managed to reduce population will see a reduction in seats.
Juxtaposing the two, following the first by letter, diminishes the second; populous states will get a larger share since they will have more constituencies, leading to reduced voice for some states.
Conversely, keeping only the federalism principle intact will go against the basic tenet of democracy, viz- vote equality. Therefore, arriving at a trade-off is necessary to protect the Indian Union.
The first freeze on apportionment in 1973 had already led to a malapportionment problem. That is, the number of people represented by one member of Parliament (MP) in many fast-growing states in the northern plains was more significant than the number of people represented by one MP in the southern states. For instance, one MP represents approximately 3.1 million citizens in Bihar,, while in Kerala, the corresponding ratio stands at 1.75 million. This directly violated the “One person-one vote" principle since the value of the vote varied widely depending on the voter’s residence. Research by Alistair McMillan showed the malapportionment to be significant in 2001. For instance, TN should have had seven fewer seats by then, while UP should have gained seven more. This research extrapolating population figures from the 2011 census to 2026 shows that the Northern states of Bihar, MP, UP and Rajasthan would gain as many as 22 seats while the southern states of TN, Kerala, AP and Telangana could lose 17 seats. This will have implications for SC/ST reservations at present and Women’s Reservation when it comes into effect.
Predictably, the issue is not just about seat arithmetic. The Southern states rightly interpret the loss of seats in the “people’s house” as a “loss of voice.” The political turmoil over this is bound to create friction in the country's polity. Therefore, it is essential to clearly understand the issue and think of pathways for the future.
Current Stance of Southern States
Sample the following statements from politicians across the southern states:
KT Rama Rao, the President of the Bharat Rashtra Samiti, said, “Southern states should not be punished for effective implementation of family planning programmes.” “We are opposed to any attempt to reduce the number of seats in Parliament. This is like punishing us for following a government of India programme,...This is a question that directly links to economics…’
Raising concerns about changing demography and its impact on the political landscape, Chandrababu Naidu, the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, said,”We are thinking of providing incentives to families with more children.” Further, in August 2024, the Naidu cabinet decided to abolish the policy that made people with more than two children ineligible to run for rural and urban local bodies.
M K Stalin, the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, echoed similar sentiments: "The Parliament delimitation process may encourage the couples to have many children and give up thoughts of a small family. But whatever be the outcome, provide Tamil names to your children,"
The Karnataka cabinet went one step further and passed a resolution against delimitation.
The delimitation exercise may be challenged legally, and the courts will weigh in to decide the balance between the two. Whichever way the court rules, the issue is bound to simmer. Strictly speaking, the southern states do not have a constitutional basis for their opposition. So, investing too much political capital may not give them the outcomes they desire. We recommend a different approach to this problem. Going back to the basics of representation for better governance, we propose that the southern states do not oppose delimitation and apportionment in totality but instead use this as an opportunity to correct the imbalances that have crept into the federal structure and weakened their political and fiscal position in the Union. Currently, two solutions are being proposed.
Postpone delimitation for another 25 years: This will not be a prudent move. The malapportionment in constituencies per state and voters represented by one MP is already high, and this will only worsen with time. It goes against the principle of democracy. In a country already under-represented in its parliament (One MP for every 2.5 million citizens against the US, roughly a third of this and other countries with fewer citizens to MP ratio), maintaining the status quo will be a travesty. Further, kicking the can further down the road will worsen the situation as future citizens must grapple with this.
Increase the size of the Loksabha: Increase the number of seats overall to ensure no state loses seats. While this “Pareto Principle” approach does not follow the delimitation arithmetic and may not completely align with the “One person-One Vote” rule, it would be better than the worst-case scenario for the Southern states- which is a reduction in the number of seats. The states in the northern plains will, by being populous anyway, get more seats. This estimate projects that we would have 848 seats, with Uttar Pradesh getting 143 seats, almost equal to all the five southern states.
The above solutions may calm the fires for now, but they do not consider the complexities of apportionment and federalism. We propose an alternate approach for the southern states to consider.
A Way Forward
The reduction in seats and a marked increase in representation for some northern states have set the alarm bells ringing. The concerns are not without basis. The southern states worked towards reducing birth rates and feel they are being punished for achieving the outcomes. This policy reversal will lead to a trust deficit and may impact future union-state relations. With this reduction of seats, the states will see their relative power decline. In addition, the five southern states that contribute close to 30% to the GDP will feel shortchanged on devolution since the devolution formula also must give a high weight to the population. Ameliorating this perception of a double penalty requires a reset of political and fiscal federalism. Losing seats should not lead to losing voice in the polity or economic losses for the states.
Constitutionally, the Union government could go ahead with the apportionment as-is without the buy-in of the states. Nothing is stopping the Union from railroading its way through. However, it would be imprudent for the Union Government to ignore the concerns of the southern states and push through the reapportionment. The Union Government should pay heed to the states' concerns for the following reasons:
The political economy narrative of reapportionment and loss of seats will most commonly play out in the emotive realms of language and culture. With the increased clout of the North Indian states in the Loksabha, the fears of language imposition will increase, stoking fires of distrust. The perceived slight on the economic and political fronts could manifest in street agitations, as seen in the 1960s. As seen with the farmer protests, the unwillingness to engage with stakeholders will lead to a political logjam that will derail the entire reapportionment and delimitation process, in addition to being detrimental to the unity and integrity of the nation.
On the other hand, the states should not block the reapportionment process and instead push for reforms.
If the states have a leverage point, does it not make sense for them to stop the apportionment exercise entirely? We do not think so. The current arrangement is ill-serving the states, specifically the southern states. The low-level equilibrium is hurting states' governance mandatetes. We explain why below. Therefore, the southern states should use this opportunity to drive a better bargain, keeping governance front and center.
We think that reapportionment and delimitation are the right things to do, and the southern states should not oppose them just on the basis of the loss of seats. The states can adopt a more strategic approach by announcing their conditional approval. Putting governance at the front and centre, they should use this opportunity to put in place a long-term reform agenda that seeks to balance their political and economic interests.
We recommend a composite economic and political reform package to precede the apportionment exercise.
On the economic front, the southern states should press for three reforms.
Increase in devolution from the current 42% to 50% to the states
While the 14th and 15th Finance Commission recommended that the states receive 42% and 41% of the divisible pool of taxes, the spending responsibilities of the states are much higher, sometimes as much as 61% of the revenue expenditure. This leads to a vertical imbalance, i.e. a lop-sided split of tax resources between the Union government and all states as a whole. If the Union government keeps less money to itself, all states stand to gain together, especially the southern states. With more general-purpose transfers coming their way, they can decide their own priorities.
A revision of the union, state, and concurrent lists
If the union government restricts itself to subjects of national importance, such as defence, foreign affairs, telecommunications, and currency, the states will have more control over outcomes in issues that affect them directly and consequently can demand more resources.
The Concurrent List was introduced in the Constitution and added to the 7th schedule ostensibly to reduce the rigidity of the principle of two-fold distribution, which is a principle followed to divide powers between the Union and the state governments by territory and subject matter. The 42nd Amendment transferred five subjects (Education, Forests, Weights and Measures, Protection of wild animals and birds and administration of Justice) from the state to the Concurrent list. The Concurrent list also establishes the supremacy of the Union government in case of a conflict. This diminishes the powers of the states. Further, an analysis of the 14th Finance Commission report shows that between 2002-05 and 2005-11, revenue expenditure by the Union Government on State List subjects increased from an average of 14 per cent to 20 per cent and on Concurrent List subjects from an average of 13 per cent to 17 per cent. The Chairman of the 15th Finance Commission had explicitly called out the need for a relook at the 7th schedule.
Finally, to restore the principle of “Subsidiarity,” viz., not delegating to a higher level what can be done at a lower level, the need for the concurrent list must be reexamined.
Reduction in the number of Centrally Sponsored Schemes
Centrally sponsored schemes require contributions from the state governments in differing ratios (50:50, 90:10,75:25 or 70:30). This reduces the ability of states to implement their own schemes and increases dependence on the Union government. Reducing centrally sponsored schemes and running a few central sector schemes (financed and run by the union government) will give the governments more leeway in driving the reform agenda for their states. At present, there are about 30 centrally sponsored schemes (Core of the core, core and major schemes), and many sub-schemes are being run. The Southern states, however, have demonstrated more capacity to run their own schemes (mid-day meals etc). So, they could use this lever to negotiate a bargain that works for them. Combining the three points—a revision of the concurrent list, a reduction in centrally sponsored schemes, and increased devolution to about 50%—would ensure economic balance.
On the political side, the southern states can demand the following:
Reform the Rajyasabha
The Rajyasabha is designed to be the forum where the states are represented in the Union and act as a check and balance on the actions of the Loksabha. Non-money bills have to be passed by the Rajyasabha after discussion. The strength of the Rajyasabha is restricted to 250 members(Including the members nominated by the President for their contribution to Art, Culture, Sports, etc). The state assemblies send representatives based on their population. If we want to protect the interests of the states and ensure the increase in seats to the more populous states does not lead to a shift in the balance of power, we could consider the following:
Make the Rajyasabha equally represented by states using the one-state- one-vote principle.
Bring back the domicile requirement to ensure that representatives are from the states they represent
Ensure direct elections to the Rajyasabha - on the lines of the Senate, where members are elected directly to represent the states, not the constituencies. Since the population factor is already accounted for in the Loksabha seat apportionment calculation, each state, irrespective of the size or population, will get a fixed number of representatives in the Rajyasabha.
An expanded role for the Inter-State council
The need for a mediating body: With frayed interstate and union-state relations, the need for a mediating body cannot be overstated. Though not a constitutional body, the erstwhile Planning Commission worked as a coordination mechanism between the Union and the state governments. The Inter-State Council was established in 1990 under Article 263 of the Constitution through a Presidential Order on the recommendation of the Sarkaria Commission. It is chaired by the PM and has all CMs of states and union territories, governors of states under President’s rule and six Cabinet rank ministers. In its current form, the interstate council is an advisory body, and its recommendations are non-binding to the government. It meets on an ad-hoc basis with no fixed agenda. The Council does not have adjudicating powers to resolve disputes between states or between the union and state governments. The Commission’s recommendation states, “Without an independent permanent secretariat, the Council will not be able to establish its credibility. Considering the nature of meetings and the level of participants, the Council’s Secretariat should be suitably staffed and modeled on the Union Cabinet Secretariat.”
As also recommended by the Punchhi report (Page 237), if the council is given adjudicatory powers and its structure and functioning give it the credibility of an impartial organisation, it can act as a countervailing force to any dominant force in Parliament. A clear demarcation between the role of the Inter-State Council and the judiciary will be necessary to avoid conflict and capture by political interests here.
Split Uttar Pradesh(UP) into smaller states
The spirit of democracy is in ensuring vote equality while maintaining federalism. The latter is violated if there is even one disproportionate actor. In the newly apportioned system, after adjusting for malapportionment, this disproportionate actor will be the state of Uttar Pradesh with 100+ seats. “The road to Delhi runs through UP”. This has already been demonstrated by the influence election results in UP have on the overall makeup of the Loksabha. In addition, historically, 9 out of the 14 PMs have come from UP. This will have a bearing on the legislative outcomes regarding issues discussed, voting patterns, etc. Therefore, the Southern states should ask for a division of UP into 2 or 3 smaller states so that their interests are protected, and to prevent UP from having a disproportionate sway over the proceedings. States in India are already large and administratively unmanageable. Breaking them into smaller ones will also help set right this imbalance.
Conclusion
Changes in representation based on demographic change are a feature of a democracy. The census of 2026 and the apportionment and delimitation exercise are bound to create friction among all stakeholders. Opposing the reapportionment exercise in totality will not lead to gains for the states and not heeding to the concerns of the states will be imprudent for the union government. The logjam resulting will lead to further trust deficit that will be detrimental to the Indian national interest. We therefore have proposed a comprehensive economic and political reform package. This would include increased vertical devolution to the states, revision of the union,state and concurrent list and a reduction of the centrally sponsored schemes on the economic front. On the political front we recommend - reforming the Rajyasabha, an expanded role for the inter state council and splitting of Uttar Pradesh as a state.